@sous-io/sous@1.0.16
Compiles AI coding agent configuration (CLAUDE.md, skills, memories) from LiquidJS templates
AI Security Review
scanned 4h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe bundle follows HTTP redirects for authenticated repository reads without removing or validating the authorization header. This can send a user's GitHub token to a redirect destination on another host, which is credential exfiltration.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user runs a command that reads a private GitHub repository and the response redirects to a host controlled by an attacker.
Impact
The redirect destination can receive the user's repository access token.
Mechanism
The client follows the redirect while reusing the original authorization headers, with no destination-host validation.
Attack narrative
When Sous reads a private GitHub repository, it can retrieve a token from the environment, Git credentials, or the GitHub CLI and attach it to an API request. If the response redirects to an attacker-controlled host, the client follows that location with the same headers. The redirected host can therefore receive the GitHub token.
AI rationale
The bundle follows HTTP redirects for authenticated repository reads without removing or validating the authorization header. This can send a user's GitHub token to a redirect destination on another host, which is credential exfiltration.
Evidence
dist/sous.js
Network endpoints3
api.github.com${repository.host}/api/v3redirect destination from the response Location header
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 94.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- GitHub repository reads can obtain tokens from environment variables, Git credentials, or the GitHub CLI and use them in an authenticated HTTP strategy.
- The authenticated request adds a bearer token to its headers.
- On a redirect, the code changes the request address and retries with the same headers, without checking that the new host is trusted.
- The initial GitHub API URL is api.github.com for github.com repositories; redirects can send its authorization header to another host.
Evidence against
- The package is a repository and AI configuration CLI, and its manifest has no install lifecycle hooks.
- Token lookup is scoped to the repository host, which is appropriate for the initial repository request.
- The redirect-following behavior is reached during repository reads, rather than by a package install hook.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
12 flaggeddist/sous.jsView file
733`));let versions=Object.keys(document.versions).filter(version2=>import_semver20.default.valid(version2)===version2).sort(import_semver20.default.rcompare),distTags={};for(let[tag,...
L734: `))}var import_semver20,NEWEST_LISTED,init_versions2=__esm({"../plugin-update/src/versions.ts"(){"use strict";import_semver20=__toESM(require_semver2(),1),NEWEST_LISTED=5}});functi...
L735: `)}}function questionText(plan,title2,index,count2){return count2>1?`${questionFor(plan,title2)} (${index} of ${count2})`:questionFor(plan,title2)}async function handle4(input,ctx)...
...
L741: || (${dataType} === "string" && ${data} && ${data} == +${data} && !(${data} % 1))`).assign(coerced,(0,codegen_1._)`+${data}`);return;case"boolean":gen.elseIf((0,codegen_1._)`${data...
L742: || ${dataType} === "boolean" |
Critical
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
dist/sous.jsView on unpkg · L733729`)?`
L730: `:"";return{file:file2,contents:JSON.stringify({...pkg,devDependencies},null,indent2)+newline,outcome:{kind:"added",section:"devDependencies",range:version2}}}var init_package_json...
L731: `).map(line=>` ${line}`)],cause:error51})}}var IGNORE_BLOCK_LINES,init_scaffold2=__esm({"../plugin-init/src/scaffold.ts"(){"use strict";init_package_json();init_templates2();IGNOR...
...
L733: `));let versions=Object.keys(document.versions).filter(version2=>import_semver20.default.valid(version2)===version2).sort(import_semver20.default.rcompare),distTags={};for(let[tag,...
L734: `))}var import_semver20,NEWEST_LISTED,init_versions2=__esm({"../plugin-update/src/versions.ts"(){"use strict";import_semver20=__toESM(require_semver2(),1),NEWEST_LISTED=5}});functi...
L735: `)}}function questi
Findings
4 Critical6 High5 Medium5 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/sous.js
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/sous.js
CriticalDownload Executedist/sous.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/sous.js
HighChild Processdist/sous.js
HighShell
HighEvaldist/sous.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/sous.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/sous.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/sous.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/sous.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @sous-io/sous@1.0.16.
See all versions of @sous-io/sous for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @sous-io/sous@1.0.16. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.