@stacksjs/actions@0.75.257
The Stacks actions.
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source shows a forced AI setup command within the explicit package-upgrade flow, while the resulting configuration changes cannot be resolved from this snapshot. The manifest has no install lifecycle hook, so this is a warning rather than a publish block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The provider detector includes Codex by default and detects other providers from project markers.
- The package upgrade flow runs `./buddy setup:ai <provider> --force` in the project root for every detected provider; no separate consent check appears at that call site.
- The package source shows this setup call inside the explicit `upgradeStacksPackages` flow, but does not show the setup command’s implementation or the exact configuration files it writes.
- The runtime operation hint builds generated route type text from collected routes; it is unrelated to agent setup.
- The inspected API fetcher sends requests to the supplied URL with client headers and body; the cited excerpt does not show a fixed unrelated recipient.
- The manifest lists `prepublishOnly` for building and has no npm install lifecycle hook, so this behavior is not activated by package installation.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/lint/stx-gate.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @stacksjs/actions@0.75.257.
See all versions of @stacksjs/actions for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @stacksjs/actions@0.75.257 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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