@stacksjs/actions@0.75.399
The Stacks actions.
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package does not show an automatic attack, but its exported SSL setup helper interpolates a caller-controlled domain into a sudo shell command. That creates a real privileged command injection risk when setup is explicitly run with an untrusted project value.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The SSL helper inserts the selected domain into a shell command that runs through sudo, without shell escaping.
- The helper accepts `options.domain` or `APP_URL`, so an attacker-controlled project value can reach that privileged command when a user explicitly runs SSL setup.
- Deployment code reads AWS credentials for its AWS deployment flow and uses AWS STS to retrieve the account identity; no unrelated credential collector was identified.
- The only lifecycle script is `prepublishOnly`, which runs the package build.
- SSL setup is exposed as a helper and requires an explicit setup call; the package entry point does not invoke it automatically.
- The reported `stacksjs.com` match in deployment is in subscriber email content, while AWS credentials are used in the AWS deployment flow.
Source & flagged code
16 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/lint/stx-gate.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @stacksjs/actions@0.75.399.
See all versions of @stacksjs/actions for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @stacksjs/actions@0.75.399 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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