@stacksjs/actions@0.75.423
The Stacks actions.
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package’s lifecycle script only builds the package, and its main entry registers an action runner without starting deployment. The flagged AWS credential reads are part of the deployment workflow, and the source did not show credentials being sent to stacksjs.com or another unrelated collector.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly, which runs the package build; there is no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook.
- The main entry registers runAction with the action runner and re-exports package APIs; it does not invoke deployment code.
- The action-runner bridge loads @stacksjs/actions only when a named action is requested and no runner is registered.
- The AWS credential reads occur in the deployment workflow, which proceeds to deployStack; no transmission of those credentials to stacksjs.com was found.
- Scanner similarity and semantic-analysis-limit alerts are leads, not source evidence of malicious behavior.
- The AWS credential and stacksjs.com matches are not a credential exfiltration chain: the domain appears in welcome-email content, while deployment uses AWS clients.
- The runtime dependency bridge is a lazy action-dispatch mechanism, not an automatic credential or network operation.
Source & flagged code
16 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/lint/stx-gate.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @stacksjs/actions@0.75.423.
See all versions of @stacksjs/actions for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @stacksjs/actions@0.75.423 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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