AI Security Review
scanned 5h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiLPM blocks this version under the AI-agent control-surface policy. The package mutates a Claude Code control surface during npm postinstall. It plants package-supplied skills, agents, and slash commands into the installing project's .claude directory without an explicit user command.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines postinstall: node bin/install.js
- bin/install.js uses INIT_CWD/process.cwd to target consumer project root
- bin/install.js recursively copies package skills, agents, and commands into project .claude/
- Dropped commands include write-in-voice, validate-voice, new-persona, profile-corpus for Claude Code
- Install script also invokes child_process.execSync('python3 --version') during postinstall
- No credential harvesting or environment secret reads found
- No network calls or remote payload download in install.js
- Python tools are local validators/profilers using stdlib-style file processing
- Claude plugin manifests are metadata only and do not register remote MCP servers
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time source drops package-supplied AI-agent/MCP control files or instructions.
bin/install.jsView on unpkg · L1Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
skills/writer-style/tools/style_lexicons.pyView on unpkg