--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@su-record/vibe/v/3.2.16" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@su-record/vibe/v/3.2.16.md" package: "@su-record/vibe" report_status: "published" title: "@su-record/vibe@3.2.16 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "3.2.16" --- # @su-record/vibe@3.2.16 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. Changes behavior across future AI-agent sessions and enables automatic post-turn actions. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Warn by default - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface - **Selected version:** 3.2.16 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Install-time code alters global Claude and, when detected, Codex control surfaces. It registers a persistent Codex lifecycle program that executes after agent turns. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 98.0% - **Started:** 2026-07-30T11:48:51.108Z - **Finished:** 2026-07-30T11:49:47.155Z - **Download time:** 1018 ms - **Static scan time:** 1911 ms - **AI review time:** 53117 ms - **Total time:** 56047 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Install-time code alters global Claude and, when detected, Codex control surfaces. It registers a persistent Codex lifecycle program that executes after agent turns. - **Trigger:** npm postinstall - **Impact:** Changes behavior across future AI-agent sessions and enables automatic post-turn actions. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, dist/cli/postinstall/main.js, dist/cli/setup/ProjectSetup.js, dist/cli/postinstall/global-config.js, hooks/scripts/codex-notify.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-07-30T11:49:47.155Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** global AI-agent configuration, instruction, skill, and notify-hook installation - **Attack narrative:** On npm installation, the postinstall entry calls main(), which installs assets into ~/.claude regardless of an explicit setup command. If Codex is detected, it appends managed instructions to ~/.codex/AGENTS.md, copies skills, and writes a notify program into ~/.codex/config.toml. That notify program automatically runs auto-commit and devlog scripts at agent-turn completion, creating an unconsented, persistent cross-project agent control surface. - **Rationale:** This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent configuration and lifecycle controls. It meets the firewall block boundary despite no observed exfiltration. - **Files touched:** package.json, dist/cli/postinstall/main.js, dist/cli/setup/ProjectSetup.js, hooks/scripts/codex-notify.js, ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md, ~/.claude/settings.json, ~/.claude/agents, ~/.claude/skills, ~/.codex/AGENTS.md, ~/.codex/config.toml, ~/.codex/skills, ~/.vibe/hooks/scripts ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 98.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** package.json runs postinstall automatically., dist/cli/postinstall/main.js writes global ~/.claude assets on install., It conditionally rewrites ~/.codex/AGENTS.md and installs a notify hook., dist/cli/setup/ProjectSetup.js adds notify to ~/.codex/config.toml., hooks/scripts/codex-notify.js runs auto-commit and devlog scripts on agent-turn completion. - **Evidence against:** No credential exfiltration or covert network call was found in inspected lifecycle code., The behavior is documented and uses managed markers, but still occurs without a user command. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node -e "import('./dist/cli/postinstall/main.js').then(m=>m.main()).catch(e=>process.stderr.write('\u26a0\ufe0f vibe postinstall skipped: '+((e&&e.message)||e)+'\n Assets and ho... ``` ### 2. Critical: Red Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 95.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node -e "import('./dist/cli/postinstall/main.js').then(m=>m.main()).catch(e=>process.stderr.write('\u26a0\ufe0f vibe postinstall skipped: '+((e&&e.message)||e)+'\n Assets and ho... ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/infra/lib/TaskContext.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L26: } L27: static fork(parentContext, forkOpts) { L28: const data = { ``` ### 6. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/infra/lib/PythonParser.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: import os from 'os'; L9: const execAsync = promisify(exec); L10: // Determine Python command based on platform ``` ### 7. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% - **Path:** dist/tools/convention/applyQualityRules.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L21: react: ['dangerouslySetInnerHTML', 'props drilling (3+ levels)'], L22: javascript: ['var usage', '== instead of ===', 'eval() usage'], L23: css: ['!important abuse', 'inline style abuse'] ``` ### 8. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/infra/lib/MemoryManager.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L33: try { L34: const fs = require('fs'); L35: if (fs.existsSync(cwdClaudePath)) { ``` ### 9. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 10. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 11. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/commands/codex-proxy.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L33: console.log(` 인증: ${auth ? AUTH_LABELS[auth.source] || auth.source : '미설정'}`); L34: console.log(` Target: ${settings.targetUrl || 'https://api.openai.com'}`); L35: console.log(` 명령어: ${settings.alias || 'vibe codex'}\n`); ... L75: // 2. 환경변수 L76: if (process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY) { L77: return { provider: 'openai', label: 'OpenAI (OPENAI_API_KEY)', key: process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY }; ... L142: function readCodexModelsCache() { L143: const codexHome = process.env.CODEX_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.codex'); L144: const cachePath = path.join(codexHome, 'models_cache.json'); L145: try { L146: const data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(cachePath, 'utf-8')); L147: return (data.models || []).map(m => m.slug).filter(Boolean); ``` ### 12. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 13. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/infra/lib/codex-proxy.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L912: const settings = getProxySettings(); L913: const defaultModel = model || process.env.CODEX_PROXY_MODEL || resolveDefaultModel(settings.model); L914: const modelSlots = resolveModelSlots(defaultModel); ... L921: console.log(`Codex Proxy :${port} | ${authLabel} | opus=${modelSlots.opus} sonnet=${modelSlots.sonnet} haiku=${modelSlots.haiku}`); L922: const child = spawn('claude', ['--dangerously-sk[redacted]', ...claudeArgs], { L923: stdio: 'inherit', ... L925: ...process.env, L926: ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: `http://localhost:${port}`, L927: ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: 'codex-proxy', ``` ### 14. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/commands/telegram.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L100: try { L101: child_process.execSync('npm install playwright', { L102: stdio: 'inherit', ``` ### 15. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 16. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 17. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** vibe/setup.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = vibe/setup.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 837 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 18. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** hooks/scripts/llm-orchestrate.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@3.2.14 matchedPath = hooks/scripts/llm-orchestrate.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:3.2.14 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/commands/telegram.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@3.2.14 matchedPath = dist/cli/commands/telegram.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:3.2.14 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/llm/gpt-commands.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@3.2.14 matchedPath = dist/cli/llm/gpt-commands.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:3.2.14 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/utils/cli-detector.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@3.2.14 matchedPath = dist/cli/utils/cli-detector.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:3.2.14 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** hooks/scripts/auto-format.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@3.2.14 matchedPath = hooks/scripts/auto-format.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:3.2.14 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 8 - **Optional dependencies:** 2 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 7 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 10 ### Published dependency entries - @clack/prompts ^1.0.0 (Dependency) - better-sqlite3 ^12.9.0 (Dependency) - chalk ^5.6.2 (Dependency) - glob ^13.0.1 (Dependency) - papaparse ^5.5.3 (Dependency) - ts-morph ^26.0.0 (Dependency) - uuidv7 ^1.1.0 (Dependency) - zod ^4.3.6 (Dependency) - @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk ^0.2.38 (OptionalDependency) - @ast-grep/napi ^0.40.5 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @su-record/vibe - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 3.2.16 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-07-30T11:44:38.954Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T08:50:56.066Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-15T12:21:29.565Z - **Known versions:** 18 - **Latest version:** 3.2.34 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** AI Coding Framework for Claude Code — 7+ agents, 52 skills, multi-LLM orchestration - **Author:** Su - **Keywords:** ai, core, coding, spec-driven, claude, agent, requirements, user-story, ultrawork, parallel-agents, memory-management, knowledge-graph - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.12.0 - **Artifact files:** 1313 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 5,347,525 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()