@superblocksteam/cli@2.0.171
Official Superblocks CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 18d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected credential path remains tied to the Superblocks service, and the preinstall hook's removal action requires confirmation. Agent-related configuration is part of an explicit setup command; the host metadata signal comes from a telemetry-gated Datadog tracer path, with no concrete attack behavior established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest runs a preinstall hook; its handler skips ordinary local installs and asks before attempting to remove conflicting Superblocks CLI installations.
- Login uses a supplied or saved Superblocks API key with the Superblocks service, and the gateway session uses its configured server URL; the inspected path shows no unrelated credential recipient.
- MCP configuration changes come from the explicit setup command, target a selected client's configuration, and add the Superblocks server entry. The packaging verifier also rejects Claude plugin artifacts.
- A bundled Datadog tracer builds host metadata for a telemetry path guarded by its instrumentation telemetry setting; this source does not establish an unrelated credential transfer.
Source & flagged code
16 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/chunk-WWL44AEF.jsView on unpkg · L25Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @superblocksteam/cli@2.0.171.
See all versions of @superblocksteam/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @superblocksteam/cli@2.0.171 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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