registry / @tanay-wispr/webflow-package / 6.6.29
@tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.6.29
Developer starter template for Finsweet projects.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner's exfiltration signal maps to visible, product-aligned browser signup/download analytics and authenticated demo functionality. Source inspection found no install-time execution or concrete malicious chain.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Loading the relevant Webflow page and completing signup, download, or microphone-demo interactions.
Impact
User-provided account, attribution, and demo-audio data is sent to the product's aligned backend when those features are used.
Mechanism
Browser-side Wispr Flow API, auth, analytics, and transcription requests.
AI rationale
The scanner's exfiltration signal maps to visible, product-aligned browser signup/download analytics and authenticated demo functionality. Source inspection found no install-time execution or concrete malicious chain.
Evidence
package.jsondist/downloads.jsdist/web-demo/index.jsREADME.md
Network endpoints6
api.wisprflow.aiapi.wisprflow.ai/api/v1/tracking/eventsapi.wisprflow.ai/api/v1/dash/client_apiapi.wisprflow.ai/api/v1/dash/webflow_demo/generate_tokendodjkfqhwrzqjwkfnthl.supabase.coapi.workos.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 93.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- dist/downloads.js sends signed-in user and attribution fields to api.wisprflow.ai for signup/download tracking.
- dist/web-demo/index.js records microphone audio after browser permission and submits it to api.wisprflow.ai.
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hooks.
- All inspected network use is browser-side product functionality tied to Wispr Flow endpoints.
- downloads.js tracking is activated in Webflow page/download flows, not during package installation or import in Node.
- No child-process, eval, dynamic code loading, filesystem harvesting, or AI-agent configuration mutation was found.
- The embedded Supabase key is an anon client key used for the bundled browser auth flow, not evidence of a harvested secret.
Behavioral surface
NetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggeddist/downloads.jsView file
•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/downloads.js:
"use strict";(()=>{var Es=Object.create;var et=Object.defineProperty;var Ts=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var xs=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var As=Object.getPrototypeOf,Rs=Object...
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/downloads.jsView on unpkg1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
matchedText = "use str...ML=`
Medium
dist/desktopAuth.jsView file
1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
matchedText = "use str...)();
Medium
Findings
1 Critical7 Medium3 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/downloads.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/downloads.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/desktopAuth.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/signup.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/login.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/androidWaitlist.js
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.6.29.
See all versions of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.6.29 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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