registry / @tanay-wispr/webflow-package / 6.7.10
@tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.10
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe critical scanner findings describe browser-side, user-invoked product flows rather than covert package behavior. There is no lifecycle hook or confirmed install-time attack path.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A visitor submits site forms or starts an app download.
Impact
User-provided form and analytics data is sent to the Wispr API during those interactions.
Mechanism
Browser form submission and download analytics requests.
AI rationale
The critical scanner findings describe browser-side, user-invoked product flows rather than covert package behavior. There is no lifecycle hook or confirmed install-time attack path.
Network endpoints1
api.wisprflow.ai
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The Android wait-list browser script posts a user-entered phone number only to the Wispr API with an authorization token.
- The downloads browser script sends app-download analytics, including optional user and marketing identifiers, to the Wispr API.
- The manifest distributes browser artifacts and has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
Evidence against
- The observed requests are tied to visible authentication, wait-list, download, and analytics flows.
- No install-time execution, shell/process execution, local file harvesting, or remote payload loading was found.
Behavioral surface
NetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/downloads.jsView file
1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView file
•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/androidWaitlist.js:
"use strict";(()=>{var Fi=Object.create;var Ft=Object.defineProperty;var Hi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Wi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Vi=Object.getPrototypeOf,Bi=Object...
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView on unpkg1"use strict";(()=>{var Fi=Object.create;var Ft=Object.defineProperty;var Hi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Wi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Vi=Object.getPrototypeOf,Bi=Object...
Findings
2 Critical7 Medium3 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/androidWaitlist.js
CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/downloads.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/desktopAuth.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/signup.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/login.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/androidWaitlist.js
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.10.
See all versions of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.10 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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