registry / @tanay-wispr/webflow-package / 6.7.12
@tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.12
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AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source shows package-aligned browser functionality with a fixed authentication destination and user-selected uploads. No automatic install execution or concrete malicious behavior was established.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Loading the browser bundle and interacting with waitlist controls.
Impact
Ordinary service authentication and submission of waitlist information; no confirmed malicious exposure or system mutation.
Mechanism
Authenticated requests use the fixed service API; screenshot uploads consume user-selected files.
AI rationale
Inspected source shows package-aligned browser functionality with a fixed authentication destination and user-selected uploads. No automatic install execution or concrete malicious behavior was established.
Network endpoints1
api.wisprflow.ai
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json defines development scripts without automatic install hooks or a runtime self-dependency.
- dist/androidWaitlist.js sends authenticated waitlist requests to the fixed Wispr Flow API.
- Screenshot submission uses a file selected through a browser file-input change event.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
NetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/downloads.jsView file
1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView file
•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/androidWaitlist.js:
"use strict";(()=>{var Vi=Object.create;var Ht=Object.defineProperty;var Bi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var zi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Ji=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gi=Object...
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView on unpkg1"use strict";(()=>{var Vi=Object.create;var Ht=Object.defineProperty;var Bi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var zi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Ji=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gi=Object...
Findings
2 Critical8 Medium3 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/androidWaitlist.js
CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/downloads.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/desktopAuth.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/signup.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/login.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/granolaSwitch.js
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.12.
See all versions of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.12 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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