registry / @tanay-wispr/webflow-package / 6.7.8
@tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.8
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe critical finding is a user-invoked waitlist submission, not covert credential harvesting. There are no install hooks or host-level execution primitives, so the observed browser API use is package-aligned.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A website visitor submits a related form or loads a page using a bundle.
Impact
User-entered form data is sent to the associated service feature.
Mechanism
Browser requests to Wispr Flow service endpoints.
AI rationale
The critical finding is a user-invoked waitlist submission, not covert credential harvesting. There are no install hooks or host-level execution primitives, so the observed browser API use is package-aligned.
Network endpoints1
api.wisprflow.ai
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 88.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The Android waitlist bundle posts a user-supplied phone number to the Wispr Flow API.
- The bundle POSTs a phone number to its Android waitlist API endpoint.
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The inspected bundles are browser-facing Webflow scripts; no shell execution, filesystem access, or runtime package installation was found.
- Network calls target Wispr Flow authentication, pricing, referral, and waitlist features, rather than an unrelated receiver.
Behavioral surface
NetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/downloads.jsView file
1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView file
•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/androidWaitlist.js:
"use strict";(()=>{var Fi=Object.create;var Ft=Object.defineProperty;var Hi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Wi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Vi=Object.getPrototypeOf,Bi=Object...
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView on unpkg1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
Findings
1 Critical7 Medium4 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/downloads.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/desktopAuth.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/signup.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/login.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/androidWaitlist.js
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowAi Review Evidencepackage.json
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.8.
See all versions of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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