registry / @tanay-wispr/webflow-package / 6.7.9
@tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.9
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe critical scanner finding reflects browser feature code rather than an npm install-time or import-time attack. The manifest has no lifecycle hook and ships no declared main/module entry point, while inspection found no host access, persistence, or covert payload execution.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A consumer would have to load a specific browser bundle in a web page and invoke its feature.
Impact
User-supplied feature data may be sent to the corresponding Wispr Flow service, but no unconsented package-level exfiltration or system mutation was found.
Mechanism
User-facing browser requests for authentication, wait-list, download, and speech features.
AI rationale
The critical scanner finding reflects browser feature code rather than an npm install-time or import-time attack. The manifest has no lifecycle hook and ships no declared main/module entry point, while inspection found no host access, persistence, or covert payload execution.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The published files are browser-oriented bundles; the declared source entry point is not included in the package files.
- The browser bundle sends wait-list submissions to the Wispr Flow API.
Evidence against
- Browser bundles contain user-facing login, wait-list, download, and speech-demo requests to Wispr Flow endpoints.
- No package-code execution, filesystem access, shell use, persistence, or hidden network receiver was found.
Behavioral surface
NetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/downloads.jsView file
1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView file
•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/androidWaitlist.js:
"use strict";(()=>{var Fi=Object.create;var Ft=Object.defineProperty;var Hi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Wi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Vi=Object.getPrototypeOf,Bi=Object...
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView on unpkg1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
Findings
1 Critical7 Medium4 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/downloads.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/desktopAuth.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/signup.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/login.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/androidWaitlist.js
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowAi Review Evidencepackage.json
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.9.
See all versions of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.7.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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