registry / @tanay-wispr/webflow-package / 6.8.0
@tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.0
Developer starter template for Finsweet projects.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source supports ordinary browser functionality with service-aligned authentication and submissions. No concrete credential exfiltration, install-hook abuse, agent-control mutation, or remote payload execution was identified.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Website loading and user interactions activate browser features; no automatic npm install hook is defined.
Impact
Expected website authentication, waitlist registration, and user-requested submissions; no confirmed malicious impact.
Mechanism
Service-session authentication and user submissions use the fixed Wispr API destination; no malicious execution or harvesting mechanism was identified.
AI rationale
Inspected source supports ordinary browser functionality with service-aligned authentication and submissions. No concrete credential exfiltration, install-hook abuse, agent-control mutation, or remote payload execution was identified.
Network endpoints2
api.wisprflow.aidodjkfqhwrzqjwkfnthl.supabase.co
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json defines development commands but no automatic install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- dist/androidWaitlist.js sends waitlist phone submissions to a fixed Wispr API endpoint.
- The waitlist obtains its authentication token from the user's service session.
- Browser bundles implement authentication, pricing, downloads, referrals, and a microphone-permission-based demo; inspection found no concrete malicious behavior.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
NetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/downloads.jsView file
1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView file
•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/androidWaitlist.js:
"use strict";(()=>{var Vi=Object.create;var Ht=Object.defineProperty;var Bi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var zi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Ji=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gi=Object...
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView on unpkg1"use strict";(()=>{var Vi=Object.create;var Ht=Object.defineProperty;var Bi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var zi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Ji=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gi=Object...
Findings
2 Critical8 Medium3 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/androidWaitlist.js
CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/downloads.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/desktopAuth.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/signup.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/login.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/granolaSwitch.js
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.0.
See all versions of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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