registry / @tanay-wispr/webflow-package / 6.8.17
@tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.17
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AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged code implements authentication and signup requests to Wispr Flow’s own API, plus a promo-code request using a supplied authorization value. The manifest publishes dist files and declares no install lifecycle hooks; the inspected evidence does not show unrelated credential collection or exfiltration.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user uses the relevant sign-in, signup, or promo-code functionality.
Impact
The reviewed requests serve the package’s apparent service flows; no unrelated credential recipient or automatic exfiltration was identified.
Mechanism
The bundles send submitted authentication data or a supplied authorization value to api.wisprflow.ai.
AI rationale
The flagged code implements authentication and signup requests to Wispr Flow’s own API, plus a promo-code request using a supplied authorization value. The manifest publishes dist files and declares no install lifecycle hooks; the inspected evidence does not show unrelated credential collection or exfiltration.
Evidence
package.jsondist/androidWaitlist.jsdist/downloads.js
Network endpoints1
api.wisprflow.ai
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 88.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The package publishes dist files and has no install, preinstall, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- The authentication code sends submitted sign-in data to https://api.wisprflow.ai/email/signin-captcha, the service’s own API.
- The downloads bundle uses a supplied Authorization value for a promo-code request to the same service.
Evidence against
- The flagged bundles contain authentication and signup logic, but the inspected requests target Wispr Flow’s own API.
- No evidence showed browser credential collection for an unrelated host or automatic credential transmission.
Behavioral surface
NetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/downloads.jsView file
1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView file
•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/androidWaitlist.js:
"use strict";(()=>{var Gi=Object.create;var Bt=Object.defineProperty;var Ki=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Yi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Xi=Object.getPrototypeOf,Qi=Object...
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView on unpkg1"use strict";(()=>{var Gi=Object.create;var Bt=Object.defineProperty;var Ki=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Yi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Xi=Object.getPrototypeOf,Qi=Object...
Findings
2 Critical7 Medium3 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/androidWaitlist.js
CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/downloads.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/desktopAuth.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/signup.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/login.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/androidWaitlist.js
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.17.
See all versions of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.17 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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