@tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.19
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AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source does not establish browser credential phishing: the authentication code targets the product's own API. However, the downloads flow automatically sends identifying user data as telemetry, which warrants a warning.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The downloads page's asynchronous flow after a signed-in session is set up.
Impact
The vendor can associate download activity with an identifiable user and correlate it with advertising and analytics records.
Mechanism
A POST sends an app_download event containing the user's email and ID, ad attribution values, and analytics client and session IDs.
AI rationale
The source does not establish browser credential phishing: the authentication code targets the product's own API. However, the downloads flow automatically sends identifying user data as telemetry, which warrants a warning.
Evidence
dist/downloads.js
Network endpoints1
api.wisprflow.ai/api/v1/tracking/events
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 82.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The downloads bundle posts an app_download event to api.wisprflow.ai with the signed-in user's ID and email, plus advertising and analytics identifiers.
- The event is sent from an asynchronous flow in the downloads bundle without an evident consent check.
- Package scripts are for development, building, linting, checking, testing, and release; no install lifecycle hook is declared.
Evidence against
- The flagged authentication code uses api.wisprflow.ai, consistent with the product's own sign-in and signup flow.
- The reviewed package metadata does not declare an install lifecycle script.
Behavioral surface
NetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/downloads.jsView file
1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView file
•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/androidWaitlist.js:
"use strict";(()=>{var Gi=Object.create;var Bt=Object.defineProperty;var Ki=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Yi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Xi=Object.getPrototypeOf,Qi=Object...
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView on unpkg1"use strict";(()=>{var Gi=Object.create;var Bt=Object.defineProperty;var Ki=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Yi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Xi=Object.getPrototypeOf,Qi=Object...
Findings
2 Critical7 Medium3 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/androidWaitlist.js
CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/downloads.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/desktopAuth.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/signup.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/login.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/androidWaitlist.js
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.19.
See all versions of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.19 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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