registry / @tanay-wispr/webflow-package / 6.8.6
@tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.6
Developer starter template for Finsweet projects.
AI Security Review
scanned 21d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the inspected credential flow targets the package's Wispr Flow API sign-in endpoint. The scanner's credential alert is consistent with ordinary authentication, with no confirmed attack surface in the inspected source.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user invokes sign-in in the browser bundle.
Impact
No adverse effect from this flow was established.
Mechanism
The bundle posts the email sign-in payload to the configured Wispr Flow API.
AI rationale
The manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the inspected credential flow targets the package's Wispr Flow API sign-in endpoint. The scanner's credential alert is consistent with ordinary authentication, with no confirmed attack surface in the inspected source.
Network endpoints1
api.wisprflow.ai
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json points to src/index.ts and lists dist as the published files directory.
- package.json contains developer scripts but no install lifecycle hook.
- dist/androidWaitlist.js sets the authentication API base to https://api.wisprflow.ai.
- The bundle posts the sign-in payload to that API's /email/signin endpoint.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
NetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/downloads.jsView file
1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView file
•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/androidWaitlist.js:
"use strict";(()=>{var Vi=Object.create;var Ht=Object.defineProperty;var Bi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var zi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Ji=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gi=Object...
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView on unpkg1"use strict";(()=>{var Vi=Object.create;var Ht=Object.defineProperty;var Bi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var zi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Ji=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gi=Object...
Findings
2 Critical7 Medium3 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/androidWaitlist.js
CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/downloads.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/desktopAuth.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/signup.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/login.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/androidWaitlist.js
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.6.
See all versions of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.