registry / @tanay-wispr/webflow-package / 6.8.7
@tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.7
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AI Security Review
scanned 19d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged transport is consistent with ordinary Wispr authentication and service requests: the inspected calls target api.wisprflow.ai. The manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the inspected source does not establish an unrelated credential recipient or other attack behavior.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User-initiated sign-in, password-reset, or promo application.
Impact
No unrelated credential recipient or confirmed attack impact was established.
Mechanism
The bundles send authentication data or an authorization value to api.wisprflow.ai for the corresponding service operation.
AI rationale
The flagged transport is consistent with ordinary Wispr authentication and service requests: the inspected calls target api.wisprflow.ai. The manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the inspected source does not establish an unrelated credential recipient or other attack behavior.
Evidence
package.jsondist/downloads.jsdist/androidWaitlist.js
Network endpoints1
api.wisprflow.ai
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 95.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json lists development and build scripts but no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- Both bundles send sign-in and password-reset requests to the fixed HTTPS endpoint api.wisprflow.ai.
- The promo helper sends its authorization value to that same service endpoint.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
NetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggeddist/downloads.jsView file
1patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1
Medium
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView file
•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/androidWaitlist.js:
"use strict";(()=>{var Vi=Object.create;var Ht=Object.defineProperty;var Bi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var zi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Ji=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gi=Object...
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/androidWaitlist.jsView on unpkg1"use strict";(()=>{var Vi=Object.create;var Ht=Object.defineProperty;var Bi=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var zi=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Ji=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gi=Object...
Findings
2 Critical7 Medium3 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/androidWaitlist.js
CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/androidWaitlist.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/downloads.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/desktopAuth.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/signup.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/login.js
MediumSecret Patterndist/androidWaitlist.js
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.7.
See all versions of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tanay-wispr/webflow-package@6.8.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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