registry / @tangle-network/sandbox-cli / 0.20.35
@tangle-network/sandbox-cli@0.20.35
CLI for Tangle Sandbox operations
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner matches resolve to explicit, disclosed telemetry setup and CLI functions for credential storage and remote sandbox process operations. The inspected code does not establish an unconsented attack surface.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user runs the `tangle connect` setup command; writing shell configuration requires an affirmative prompt response.
Impact
If configured, the agent sends telemetry to the configured endpoint; the inspected source does not establish covert credential theft or command-output exfiltration.
Mechanism
The command prints telemetry settings for a configurable endpoint. Content collection defaults to full, but the command describes the content tiers and supports metadata-only settings and no-write output.
AI rationale
The scanner matches resolve to explicit, disclosed telemetry setup and CLI functions for credential storage and remote sandbox process operations. The inspected code does not establish an unconsented attack surface.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.mjs
Network endpoints1
intelligence.tangle.tools/v1/otlp
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 88.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json exposes a CLI and module entrypoint, with no install lifecycle hook.
- Telemetry setup is an explicit `tangle connect` command; it uses Tangle Intelligence by default and permits a caller-supplied endpoint.
- The setup describes its content tiers, defaults to full content, and asks before writing the shell configuration.
- The required inspected dependency paths are SDK manifests, telemetry helpers, and type/interface exports; they do not establish an attack path.
Evidence against
- The setup prints the configuration and privacy information; shell changes require an affirmative response, and `--no-write` is available.
- The suspicious subprocess matches are CLI credential-store helpers and user-requested remote sandbox process operations, not evidence of local command-output exfiltration.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinified
Source & flagged code
6 flaggeddist/index.mjsView file
1import{createRequire as e}from"node:module";import"dotenv/config";import{Command as t}from"commander";import{createHash as n,randomBytes as r,randomUUID as i}from"node:crypto";impo...
L2: `);return`Hub connection reference is ambiguous: "${e}" matches ${t.length} connections. Use a connection id or provider:account instead.
High
1import{createRequire as e}from"node:module";import"dotenv/config";import{Command as t}from"commander";import{createHash as n,randomBytes as r,randomUUID as i}from"node:crypto";impo...
L2: `);return`Hub connection reference is ambiguous: "${e}" matches ${t.length} connections. Use a connection id or provider:account instead.
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/index.mjsView on unpkg · L1•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.mjs:
import{createRequire as e}from"node:module";import"dotenv/config";import{Command as t}from"commander";import{createHash as n,randomBytes as r,randomUUID as i}from"node:crypto";impo...
`+n}function qn(e,t){return[...t,e]}async function Jn(e,t){let n=e.map(e=>{let t=e.trim(),n=t.indexOf(`:`);return n===-1?{raw:e,ref:null,tail:null}:{raw:e,ref:t.slice(0,n).trim(),t...
}`}}function Hr(e){return{anthropic:`Anthropic Messages API (Claude)`,openai:`OpenAI Chat Completions (function calling)`,"vercel-ai":`Vercel AI SDK (generateText / streamText)`,ma...
`),e(t.trim())})})}async function V(e,t){let n=(await import(`node:readline
Findings
5 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.mjs
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.mjs
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.mjs
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.mjs
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tangle-network/sandbox-cli@0.20.35.
See all versions of @tangle-network/sandbox-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tangle-network/sandbox-cli@0.20.35 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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