@tangle-network/sandbox-cli@0.20.37
CLI for Tangle Sandbox operations
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe bundled runtime routes wallet transaction transport through a fixed, unexplained sponsor host during explicit Solve submissions. This creates an unresolved endpoint trust risk, but the inspected source does not establish credential theft or other concrete malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package exposes a CLI that imports the bundled runtime, and its scripts show no install hook.
- The runtime pins a sponsor endpoint under drew-gtr-pro.taild10bfc.ts.net and checks solve metadata against that deployment.
- The solve wallet client uses the sponsor URL as a transaction transport; the endpoint is reached through the explicit solve submit command.
- The inspected behavior is activated by a user-invoked submission command; the source does not establish credential theft or another confirmed attack.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedA single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/index.mjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tangle-network/sandbox-cli@0.20.37.
See all versions of @tangle-network/sandbox-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tangle-network/sandbox-cli@0.20.37 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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