@tangle-network/sandbox-cli@0.21.25
CLI for Tangle Sandbox operations
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no lifecycle scripts, and the executable entry point only imports the CLI. The reviewed credential and process behavior appears tied to user-invoked commands; the scanner leads did not establish automatic credential exfiltration or command-output theft.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes a CLI and dist entry point, with no install, preinstall, or postinstall lifecycle scripts.
- The bin file only imports the CLI entry point; the reviewed credential and shell actions are part of explicit CLI commands.
- The credential-related command clears inherited Anthropic credentials before invoking `claude setup-token`.
- The changed package manifest pins `cli-bridge` to a GitHub tarball, but the reviewed source does not show that dependency being used for install-time data collection.
- The CLI contains network, filesystem, and process execution capabilities, including code that handles command output.
- A hard-coded sponsor URL uses `drew-gtr-pro.taild10bfc.ts.net`; the inspected excerpt does not establish whether this endpoint is publisher-controlled or harmful.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/index.mjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tangle-network/sandbox-cli@0.21.25.
See all versions of @tangle-network/sandbox-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tangle-network/sandbox-cli@0.21.25 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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