@taskless/cli-nightly@0.11.4-20260927201224x86799ef
Nightly build of [`@taskless/cli`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@taskless/cli) — the same source and the same build, published from an unreleased commit on `main`.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is a first-party CLI that mutates agent skill directories only after the taskless command runs, which is a guarded agent-capability change rather than an install-time hijack. No lifecycle hook, remote payload, or credential exfiltration was found in that path.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
User or script runs the taskless binary, especially init or a bare TTY invocation.
Impact
Project agent control files can gain Taskless skills and commands after an explicit CLI run. There is no install-hook mutation and no shown secret theft.
Mechanism
The CLI detects .claude, .cursor, .opencode, or .codex markers and writes bundled Taskless skills and commands under those install directories, falling back to .agents when none are detected.
AI rationale
The package is a first-party CLI that mutates agent skill directories only after the taskless command runs, which is a guarded agent-capability change rather than an install-time hijack. No lifecycle hook, remote payload, or credential exfiltration was found in that path.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.js.claude.cursor.opencode.agents.taskless
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 78.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json defines a taskless bin at dist/index.js and has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The init command installs or updates bundled Taskless skills and commands into detected agent directories such as .claude, .cursor, .opencode, and .agents, with .agents as the fallback.
- A bare CLI invocation with only known flags can enter the interactive install path; scripted installs are the explicit taskless init command.
Evidence against
- Agent directory writes are reached from the CLI command dispatcher, not from an npm lifecycle script.
- The written content is this package's own skill and command stubs for the Taskless product, not a remote payload.
- No credential harvesting, shell eval, or self-install of another release was found in the install path.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsTelemetry
Source & flagged code
4 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
import { readFile as P, mkdir as V, writeFile as M, rm as he, readdir as oe, stat as Se, mkdtemp as ml, copyFile as cd, glob as ud, access as fd, readlink as dd, rename as Ht, cp a...
import { createReadStream as md, globSync as yd, existsSync as ms, readFileSync as bl, mkdtempSync as wd, writeFileSync as bd, rmSync as vd } from "node:fs";
import Sd, { createInterface as Ls } from "node:readline";
this.flushPromise = null, this.shutdownPromise = null, this.promiseQueue = new Tp(), this._events = new Mp(), this._isInitialized = !1, xp(t, "You must pass your PostHog project's ...
throw this.beginBackoff(), new Rt(`Your pro
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: import _, { stdin as od, stdout as pl } from "node:process";
L3: import * as li from "node:tty";
...
L10: import { AsyncLocalStorage as kd } from "node:async_hooks";
L11: import { execFile as Yt, spawn as ht } from "node:child_process";
L12: import { RULES_DIRECTORY as G, TASKLESS_DIRECTORY as $d, ENGINES as qe, ENGINE_LAYOUTS as Ze, isKnownEngine as gr, RULE_TESTS_DIRECTORY as ge } from "./layout.js";
...
L458: platform: Ph = ""
L459: } = typeof process > "u" ? {} : process, jh = "NO_COLOR" in Qe || Il.includes("--no-color"), Dh = "FORCE_COLOR" in Qe || Il.includes("--color"), Mh = Ph === "win32", Al = Qe.TERM =...
L460: function Cl(e, t, n, s, i = t.slice(0, Math.max(0, e)) + s, r = t.slice(Math.max(0, e + n.length)), o = r.indexOf(n)) {
...
L629: }
L630: for
Findings
2 High4 Medium6 Low
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighObfuscated Payload Loaderdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
MediumSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
LowScripts Present
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @taskless/cli-nightly@0.11.4-20260927201224x86799ef.
See all versions of @taskless/cli-nightly for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @taskless/cli-nightly@0.11.4-20260927201224x86799ef before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.