@taskless/cli-nightly@0.12.0-20260930174450x837ef1e
Nightly build of [`@taskless/cli`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@taskless/cli) — the same source and the same build, published from an unreleased commit on `main`.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source supports an explicit CLI capability to modify agent skills and commands, warranting a warning under the supplied agent policy. No npm installation hook, runtime self-dependency, or concrete malicious chain supports publication blocking.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Running taskless interactively and selecting tools, or explicitly running taskless init.
Impact
Taskless instructions become available to AI agents and can influence their workflow. The supplied policy treats this explicit agent configuration capability as warning-worthy.
Mechanism
Setup detects agent directories, writes bundled skills and command references, and records installed targets. Subsequent setup invocations can refresh these files without a separate update prompt.
AI rationale
Inspected source supports an explicit CLI capability to modify agent skills and commands, warranting a warning under the supplied agent policy. No npm installation hook, runtime self-dependency, or concrete malicious chain supports publication blocking.
Evidence
dist/index.js.taskless.claude.agents.cursor.opencode
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The taskless CLI entrypoint is dist/index.js; package.json defines no npm installation hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- Setup targets .claude, .agents, .cursor, and .opencode for Taskless skills and commands.
- The installer creates agent skill directories and writes SKILL.md references.
- Interactive setup asks which tools to enable before applying installation changes.
- The explicit init command performs installation without prompts and refreshes bundled skills using the current CLI version.
Evidence against
- Agent integration is activated through CLI setup, rather than an npm installation hook.
- Inspected behavior installs package-specific integrations; no concrete malicious installation chain was established.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsTelemetryUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
4 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
import { readFile as j, mkdir as q, writeFile as B, rm as te, readdir as H, stat as pe, mkdtemp as _l, copyFile as Il, glob as Rd, access as Od, readlink as Fd, rename as ze, cp as...
import { createReadStream as Md, globSync as Ud, existsSync as ks, readFileSync as Al, rmSync as Cl, mkdtempSync as Bd, writeFileSync as Vd } from "node:fs";
import qd, { createInterface as Bs } from "node:readline";
this.flushPromise = null, this.shutdownPromise = null, this.promiseQueue = new Xp(), this._events = new lg(), this._isInitialized = !1, sg(t, "You must pass your PostHog project's ...
throw this.beginBackoff(), new jt(`Your pro
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: import E, { stdin as Id, stdout as $l } from "node:process";
L3: import * as gi from "node:tty";
...
L10: import { AsyncLocalStorage as Kd } from "node:async_hooks";
L11: import { execFile as en, spawn as vt } from "node:child_process";
L12: import { RULES_DIRECTORY as G, TASKLESS_DIRECTORY as Wd, ENGINES as Re, ENGINE_LAYOUTS as lt, RULE_TESTS_DIRECTORY as fe, isKnownEngine as St } from "./layout.js";
...
L458: platform: rp = ""
L459: } = typeof process > "u" ? {} : process, op = "NO_COLOR" in ot || jl.includes("--no-color"), ap = "FORCE_COLOR" in ot || jl.includes("--color"), lp = rp === "win32", Dl = ot.TERM =...
L460: function Ml(e, t, n, s, i = t.slice(0, Math.max(0, e)) + s, r = t.slice(Math.max(0, e + n.length)), o = r.indexOf(n)) {
...
L629: }
L630: for
Findings
2 High4 Medium6 Low
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighObfuscated Payload Loaderdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSuspicious Dependency Evidencepackage.json
MediumAi Review Evidencedist/index.js
LowScripts Present
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @taskless/cli-nightly@0.12.0-20260930174450x837ef1e.
See all versions of @taskless/cli-nightly for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @taskless/cli-nightly@0.12.0-20260930174450x837ef1e before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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