@taskless/cli-nightly@0.12.0-20261002181147x023048f
Nightly build of [`@taskless/cli`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@taskless/cli) — the same source and the same build, published from an unreleased commit on `main`.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source establishes explicit CLI setup that modifies agent instruction directories, supporting a capability warning under the supplied policy. There are no npm install hooks, and the flagged decoding and eval examples do not establish a hidden executable payload or malicious credential redirection.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Running taskless init, or completing interactive setup through a bare CLI invocation.
Impact
Taskless instructions become available to agents, and subsequent setup invocations can change those instructions.
Mechanism
Setup detects agent directories, writes Taskless skill and command files, and records installation state. Later init runs can update or remove recorded integration files without another prompt.
AI rationale
Inspected source establishes explicit CLI setup that modifies agent instruction directories, supporting a capability warning under the supplied policy. There are no npm install hooks, and the flagged decoding and eval examples do not establish a hidden executable payload or malicious credential redirection.
Evidence
dist/index.js.taskless.claude.agents.cursor.opencode
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json exposes dist/index.js as the taskless CLI; it has no npm install lifecycle hooks.
- The explicit init command invokes setup without a separate confirmation prompt.
- Setup writes Taskless skills and command stubs into detected .claude, .agents, .cursor, and .opencode directories.
- Interactive setup asks which tools to enable before applying changes.
- Setup records installed targets and version; later init invocations reconcile files without another prompt.
Evidence against
- No concrete malicious execution or credential theft was established.
- The apparent eval payload is embedded demonstration text; character decoding belongs to YAML binary serialization.
- Agent writes are confined to Taskless integration files and activated through CLI setup.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsTelemetry
Source & flagged code
4 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
import { readFile as j, mkdir as q, writeFile as B, rm as ne, readdir as J, stat as pe, mkdtemp as jl, copyFile as Dl, glob as eh, access as th, readlink as nh, rename as Je, cp as...
import { createReadStream as ch, globSync as uh, existsSync as Ts, readFileSync as Ul, rmSync as Bl, mkdtempSync as fh, writeFileSync as dh } from "node:fs";
import hh, { createInterface as Gs } from "node:readline";
this.flushPromise = null, this.shutdownPromise = null, this.promiseQueue = new kg(), this._events = new Fg(), this._isInitialized = !1, Ag(t, "You must pass your PostHog project's ...
throw this.beginBackoff(), new Vt(`Your pro
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: import E, { stdin as Yd, stdout as xl } from "node:process";
L3: import * as Si from "node:tty";
...
L10: import { AsyncLocalStorage as ph } from "node:async_hooks";
L11: import { execFile as on, spawn as $t } from "node:child_process";
L12: import { RULES_DIRECTORY as z, TASKLESS_DIRECTORY as gh, ENGINES as Re, ENGINE_LAYOUTS as ut, RULE_TESTS_DIRECTORY as fe, isKnownEngine as Ct } from "./layout.js";
...
L458: platform: Cp = ""
L459: } = typeof process > "u" ? {} : process, Rp = "NO_COLOR" in lt || Jl.includes("--no-color"), Op = "FORCE_COLOR" in lt || Jl.includes("--color"), Fp = Cp === "win32", Yl = lt.TERM =...
L460: function Ql(e, t, n, s, i = t.slice(0, Math.max(0, e)) + s, r = t.slice(Math.max(0, e + n.length)), o = r.indexOf(n)) {
...
L629: }
L630: for
Findings
2 High4 Medium6 Low
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighObfuscated Payload Loaderdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
MediumAi Review Evidencedist/index.js
LowScripts Present
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @taskless/cli-nightly@0.12.0-20261002181147x023048f.
See all versions of @taskless/cli-nightly for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @taskless/cli-nightly@0.12.0-20261002181147x023048f before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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