registry / @taskless/cli-nightly / 0.12.1-20261012215932x47f5f96
@taskless/cli-nightly@0.12.1-20261012215932x47f5f96
Nightly build of [`@taskless/cli`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@taskless/cli) — the same source and the same build, published from an unreleased commit on `main`.
AI Security Review
scanned 23d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s eval signal comes from an embedded example rule, and the credential flow targets the configured Taskless API, whose default is app.taskless.io/cli. The explicit agent setup warrants a warning under the package-owned extension policy, but no blocking attack behavior was established.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user or automation invokes the taskless init command.
Impact
The project’s AI-agent instructions are added or updated; the inspected path does not show an npm install hook performing this setup.
Mechanism
The CLI selects detected agent directories and writes Taskless skill content or reference stubs there.
AI rationale
The scanner’s eval signal comes from an embedded example rule, and the credential flow targets the configured Taskless API, whose default is app.taskless.io/cli. The explicit agent setup warrants a warning under the package-owned extension policy, but no blocking attack behavior was established.
Evidence
dist/index.js.claude.opencode
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json exposes a CLI; its listed scripts are build and development tasks, with no npm install lifecycle hook.
- The bundle detects agent projects and maps them to install directories such as .claude.
- The explicit init command calls the setup routine; it is not invoked by an npm lifecycle hook.
- The setup routine writes Taskless skills or command stubs into selected agent directories.
- The API client defaults to app.taskless.io/cli and sends a bearer token through that configured client.
- The eval(payload) text is part of an embedded example rule, not an executed payload loader.
Evidence against
- No source inspected establishes credential theft, hidden-code execution, or an install-time agent configuration change.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsTelemetryUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
4 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
import { readFile as D, mkdir as W, writeFile as V, rm as ie, readdir as Q, stat as ge, mkdtemp as ec, copyFile as tc, glob as nc, access as Ch, readlink as Rh, rename as Qe, cp as...
import { createReadStream as jh, existsSync as Tn, globSync as ic, readFileSync as rc, rmSync as oc, mkdtempSync as Dh, writeFileSync as Mh } from "node:fs";
import Uh, { createInterface as Pn } from "node:readline";
this.flushPromise = null, this.shutdownPromise = null, this.promiseQueue = new am(), this._events = new ym(), this._isInitialized = !1, dm(t, "You must pass your PostHog project's ...
throw this.beginBackoff(), new Kt(`Your pro
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: import k, { stdin as _h, stdout as Xl } from "node:process";
L3: import * as _i from "node:tty";
...
L10: import { AsyncLocalStorage as Bh } from "node:async_hooks";
L11: import { execFile as un, spawn as dt } from "node:child_process";
L12: import { RULES_DIRECTORY as J, TASKLESS_DIRECTORY as qh, ENGINES as Fe, ENGINE_LAYOUTS as ht, RULE_TESTS_DIRECTORY as he, isKnownEngine as Ot } from "./layout.js";
...
L458: platform: ag = ""
L459: } = typeof process > "u" ? {} : process, lg = "NO_COLOR" in ut || pc.includes("--no-color"), cg = "FORCE_COLOR" in ut || pc.includes("--color"), ug = ag === "win32", gc = ut.TERM =...
L460: function mc(e, t, n, s, i = t.slice(0, Math.max(0, e)) + s, r = t.slice(Math.max(0, e + n.length)), o = r.indexOf(n)) {
...
L629: }
L630: for
Findings
2 High4 Medium6 Low
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighObfuscated Payload Loaderdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
MediumAi Review Evidencedist/index.js
LowScripts Present
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @taskless/cli-nightly@0.12.1-20261012215932x47f5f96.
See all versions of @taskless/cli-nightly for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @taskless/cli-nightly@0.12.1-20261012215932x47f5f96 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.