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@techierathore/techieflow@1.0.4: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @techierathore/techieflow / 1.0.4

@techierathore/techieflow@1.0.4

TechieFlow: a spec-driven development framework for AI coding agents, for Claude Code and OpenCode. One command installs it into any project.

AI Security Review

scanned 27d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installing the package as a dependency runs a project-scoped installer automatically. It writes Claude Code and OpenCode control files, then erases much of the npm installation footprint.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm install or npm ci that installs this package in a consumer project

Impact

A dependency installation can silently alter how AI coding agents execute in the consumer project and obscure the package's installation record.

Mechanism

Postinstall scaffolding of AI-agent configuration followed by detached cleanup

Policy narrative

During npm dependency installation, postinstall invokes the package installer against INIT_CWD. That installer deploys framework files, Claude Code commands and settings, and an OpenCode bridge into the consumer project. It then starts a detached cleanup process that removes the package directory, command shim, dependency entry, and potentially npm metadata. This leaves persistent AI-agent behavior in the project while concealing the dependency installation footprint.

AI rationale

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of consumer AI-agent control surfaces and deliberately removes its own npm traces. That meets the install-control-surface blocking policy even though no secret exfiltration was found.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/npm-postinstall.mjsscripts/install.mjsscripts/npm-cleanup.mjs.tfcore/.claude/commands/.claude/settings.json

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/npm[redacted]

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

scripts/install.mjsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. file of shippedfiles(".opencode/command", ".md")) if (!librarypersonas.has(file)) plan(`.opencode/command/${file}`); for (const path of [".codex", ".agents/skills"]) if (existssync(join(target, path))) plan(path, "(retired codex adapter)"); for (const lib of [".trblazeui", ".techierag"]) { if (!existssync(join(target, lib))) continue; const rest = readdirsync(join(target, lib)).filter((f) => f !== ".codex-agent-package-owned" && f !== ".gitignore"); plan(`${lib}/.codex-agent-package-owned`); if (rest.length === 0) plan(`${lib}/.gitignore`); } if (existssync(join(target,

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

scripts/install.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.3 matchedPath = scripts/install.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/install.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 0ee850fe867a862a signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.3 matchedPath = scripts/install.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.3 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 3 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

scripts/install.mjsView on unpkg

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView file

•path = .tfcore/utils/tf-goal.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 34866 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView on unpkg

•path = .tfcore/utils/tf-goal.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 34866 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView on unpkg

scripts/install.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

scripts/install.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/npm-postinstall.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.3 matchedPath = scripts/npm[redacted] matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/npm-postinstall.mjsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 25-58json

25 },

26 "files": [

27 ".tfcore",

28 "!.tfcore/.session",

29 ".claude/commands",

30 "!.claude/commands/trblazeui.md",

31 "!.claude/commands/techierag.md",

32 ".opencode/plugin",

33 ".opencode/command",

34 "!.opencode/command/trblazeui.md",

35 "!.opencode/command/techierag.md",

36 "opencode.jsonc",

37 "scripts/install.mjs",

38 "scripts/npm-postinstall.mjs",

39 "scripts/npm-cleanup.mjs",

40 "docs/TechieFlow-Installation.md",

41 "LICENSE",

42 "README.md"

43 ],

44 "scripts": {

45 "postinstall": "node scripts/npm-postinstall.mjs",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L45

46 "validate": "node scripts/validate.mjs",

47 "test:install": "node scripts/test-install.mjs",

48 "pack:check": "npm pack --dry-run",

49 "prepublishOnly": "npm run validate && npm run test:install"

50 },

51 "engines": {

52 "node": ">=20"

53 },

54 "publishConfig": {

55 "access": "public"

56 }

57}

58

scripts/install.mjsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. file of shippedfiles(".opencode/command", ".md")) if (!librarypersonas.has(file)) plan(`.opencode/command/${file}`); for (const path of [".codex", ".agents/skills"]) if (existssync(join(target, path))) plan(path, "(retired codex adapter)"); for (const lib of [".trblazeui", ".techierag"]) { if (!existssync(join(target, lib))) continue; const rest = readdirsync(join(target, lib)).filter((f) => f !== ".codex-agent-package-owned" && f !== ".gitignore"); plan(`${lib}/.codex-agent-package-owned`); if (rest.length === 0) plan(`${lib}/.gitignore`); } if (existssync(join(target,

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

scripts/install.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.3 matchedPath = scripts/install.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/install.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 0ee850fe867a862a signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.3 matchedPath = scripts/install.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.3 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 3 summary = package final verdict is malicious

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView file

•path = .tfcore/utils/tf-goal.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 34866 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView on unpkg

•path = .tfcore/utils/tf-goal.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 34866 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView on unpkg

scripts/install.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

scripts/install.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/npm-postinstall.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.3 matchedPath = scripts/npm[redacted] matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/npm-postinstall.mjsView on unpkg