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@techierathore/techieflow@1.1.0: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @techierathore/techieflow / 1.1.0

@techierathore/techieflow@1.1.0

TechieFlow: a spec-driven development framework for AI coding agents, for Claude Code and OpenCode. One command installs it into any project.

AI Security Review

scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. The npm postinstall hook automatically changes the consumer project's AI-agent controls. It creates broad Claude Code permissions and deploys OpenCode configuration and plugins without specific consent.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm install or npm ci with lifecycle scripts enabled in a consumer project.

Impact

Future agent sessions can gain shell and file modification permissions and load installed agent plugins without the consumer explicitly authorizing these changes.

Mechanism

The hook passes INIT_CWD to the installer, which writes agent configuration and plugin files. Missing Claude Code settings receive broad permission grants.

Policy narrative

An ordinary dependency installation activates the postinstall hook, which launches the framework installer against the consumer project. The installer creates Claude Code settings allowing broad tools and installs OpenCode configuration and plugins. Existing Claude settings are preserved, but projects without those settings receive the permission grants automatically. The .NET compatibility prompt does not request consent to agent control changes and is skipped in noninteractive execution.

AI rationale

Source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the supplied blocking rule. Preserving existing Claude settings limits exposure but does not prevent automatic permission grants in other projects.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/npm-postinstall.mjsscripts/install.mjs.claude/settings.json

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/npm[redacted]

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

scripts/install.mjsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. file of shippedfiles(".opencode/command", ".md")) if (!librarypersonas.has(file)) plan(`.opencode/command/${file}`); for (const path of [".codex", ".agents/skills"]) if (existssync(join(target, path))) plan(path, "(retired codex adapter)"); for (const lib of [".trblazeui", ".techierag"]) { if (!existssync(join(target, lib))) continue; const rest = readdirsync(join(target, lib)).filter((f) => f !== ".codex-agent-package-owned" && f !== ".gitignore"); plan(`${lib}/.codex-agent-package-owned`); if (rest.length === 0) plan(`${lib}/.gitignore`); } if (existssync(join(target,

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

scripts/install.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.4 matchedPath = scripts/install.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/install.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 0ee850fe867a862a signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.4 matchedPath = scripts/install.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.4 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 3 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

scripts/install.mjsView on unpkg

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView file

•path = .tfcore/utils/tf-goal.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 35106 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView on unpkg

•path = .tfcore/utils/tf-goal.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 35106 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView on unpkg

scripts/install.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

scripts/install.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/npm-postinstall.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.4 matchedPath = scripts/npm[redacted] matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/npm-postinstall.mjsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 25-58json

25 },

26 "files": [

27 ".tfcore",

28 "!.tfcore/.session",

29 ".claude/commands",

30 "!.claude/commands/trblazeui.md",

31 "!.claude/commands/techierag.md",

32 ".opencode/plugin",

33 ".opencode/command",

34 "!.opencode/command/trblazeui.md",

35 "!.opencode/command/techierag.md",

36 "opencode.jsonc",

37 "scripts/install.mjs",

38 "scripts/npm-postinstall.mjs",

39 "scripts/npm-cleanup.mjs",

40 "docs/TechieFlow-Installation.md",

41 "LICENSE",

42 "README.md"

43 ],

44 "scripts": {

45 "postinstall": "node scripts/npm-postinstall.mjs",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L45

46 "validate": "node scripts/validate.mjs",

47 "test:install": "node scripts/test-install.mjs",

48 "pack:check": "npm pack --dry-run",

49 "prepublishOnly": "npm run validate && npm run test:install"

50 },

51 "engines": {

52 "node": ">=20"

53 },

54 "publishConfig": {

55 "access": "public"

56 }

57}

58

scripts/install.mjsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. file of shippedfiles(".opencode/command", ".md")) if (!librarypersonas.has(file)) plan(`.opencode/command/${file}`); for (const path of [".codex", ".agents/skills"]) if (existssync(join(target, path))) plan(path, "(retired codex adapter)"); for (const lib of [".trblazeui", ".techierag"]) { if (!existssync(join(target, lib))) continue; const rest = readdirsync(join(target, lib)).filter((f) => f !== ".codex-agent-package-owned" && f !== ".gitignore"); plan(`${lib}/.codex-agent-package-owned`); if (rest.length === 0) plan(`${lib}/.gitignore`); } if (existssync(join(target,

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

scripts/install.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.4 matchedPath = scripts/install.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/install.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 0ee850fe867a862a signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.4 matchedPath = scripts/install.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.4 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 3 summary = package final verdict is malicious

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView file

•path = .tfcore/utils/tf-goal.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 35106 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView on unpkg

•path = .tfcore/utils/tf-goal.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 35106 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.shView on unpkg

scripts/install.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

scripts/install.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/npm-postinstall.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @techierathore/techieflow@1.0.4 matchedPath = scripts/npm[redacted] matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/npm-postinstall.mjsView on unpkg