@tekmidian/pai@0.71.4

⚠ Under review

PAI Knowledge OS — Personal AI Infrastructure with federated memory and project management

AI Security Review

scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The examined scanner leads did not prove malicious behavior: the model fetch is checksum-verified, and the CLI excerpt inspects process settings without showing token transmission. The large CLI and related configuration paths were not fully resolved, so the package’s overall behavior remains uncertain.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The model download occurs when Ollama provisioning needs the model; the CLI audit behavior is available through runtime commands.

Impact

The inspected code does not establish an attack impact; unresolved behavior elsewhere prevents a clean determination.

Mechanism

The reviewed download fetches a model from Hugging Face and checks its size and checksum. The reviewed CLI excerpt reads process environment details, but does not show a credential transfer.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsondist/embedding-gate-B4jwiqN2.mjsdist/cli/index.mjs

Network endpoints1

huggingface.co/yixuan-chia/snowflake-arctic-embed-m-v1.5-GGUF/resolve/main/snowflake-arctic-embed-m-v1.5-F16.gguf

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Manual Review at 55.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.

AI review observations

package.json exposes CLI and daemon entrypoints and lists only a prepublishOnly lifecycle script, which runs a build and a worker command.
The flagged embedding bundle downloads a size- and checksum-verified model from Hugging Face for local Ollama provisioning.
The flagged CLI excerpt inspects running Claude process settings and records whether an authentication token is present; it does not show a token being sent.
The CLI excerpt describes adding settings to Claude Code’s own configuration, but does not establish the full activation and consent path.

Evidence against

The inspected excerpts do not establish credential exfiltration, an install-time attack, or unconsented agent configuration mutation.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

15 flagged

dist/session-B3qJnaix.mjsView file

23import chalk, { Chalk } from "chalk"; L24: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L25: import { createInterface } from "node:readline";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/session-B3qJnaix.mjsView on unpkg · L23

dist/run-BF56afeQ.mjsView file

1501* iTerm's split command parameter execs without a shell (proven live: panes L1502: * survive `sleep 30` and a single-quoted `/bin/sh -c`, die instantly on L1503: * `export …; …` or a redirect), so the command must be one exec-able line.

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/run-BF56afeQ.mjsView on unpkg · L1501

dist/project-setup-Cu0Bumqv.mjsView file

9import { r as isLoopbackProvider } from "./run-env-DBJ8ml-Z.mjs"; L10: import { $ as waitingLine, D as bashExitCode, E as WAIT_EXIT_STILL_RUNNING, G as statusMarker, I as renderReport, J as detachedLine, K as statusQueue, O as isWaitPollCommand, P as ... L11: import { E as probeLoopback, O as resolveLocalProvider, S as LOCAL_MECHANISM_LINE, k as resolveRunnerProvider } from "./budget-CuL0Q5aB.mjs"; ... L23: import { basename, dirname, join, relative, resolve } from "node:path"; L24: import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; L25: import { Document, parse } from "yaml"; ... L78: function agentsDir() { L79: return join(homedir(), ".claude", "agents"); L80: } ... L499: /** L500: * `HH:MM:SS` at an offset east of UTC in minutes (Date.getTimezoneOffset() L501: * negated), fro

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/project-setup-Cu0Bumqv.mjsView on unpkg · L9

dist/indexer-backend-DxI_YJf1.mjsView file

14import { basename, delimiter, dirname, join } from "node:path"; L15: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L16: import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; ... L542: ...opts, L543: body: effectiveBody L544: }); ... L580: function getPaiDir() { L581: const envDir = process.env.ADAPTER_DIR || process.env.PAI_DIR; L582: if (envDir) try { ... L586: } L587: return join(homedir(), ".claude"); L588: }

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/indexer-backend-DxI_YJf1.mjsView on unpkg · L14

dist/cli/index.mjsView file

1861try { L1862: return (await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/v1/models`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3e3) })).ok; L1863: } catch { ... L1872: const [cmd, ...args] = plan.argv; L1873: const child = spawn(cmd, args, { L1874: env: { L1875: ...process.env, L1876: ...plan.env

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

dist/cli/index.mjsView on unpkg · L1861

•Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli/index.mjs Reachable file contains a blocking source-risk pattern.

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/cli/index.mjsView on unpkg

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli/index.mjs: import { appendFileSync, chmodSync, closeSync, copyFileSync, cpSync, createReadStream, createWriteStream, existsSync, fstatSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readFileSync, readS... import { createInterface } from "node:readline"; for (const p of pages) writeFileSync(join(dir, p.name), p.markdown); writeFileSync(file, md + "\n"); if (!existsSync(envFile)) writeFileSync(envFile, "arm load thermal\n"); writeFileSync(file, `# A/B results\n\nGenerated by \`pai worker bench\`; void rows excluded from pass/total.\n\n${aggregate(rows)}\n`); const SETTINGS_FILE = join(join(homedir(), ".claude"), "settings.json"); * ~/.cla

dist/embedding-gate-B4jwiqN2.mjsView file

5Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L5: import { join } from "node:path"; L6: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L7: import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; ... L64: const OLLAMA_DEFAULT_MODEL = "arctic-embed-m-v1.5-f16"; L65: const OLLAMA_DEFAULT_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:11434"; L66: const TOKENIZER_MODEL = "Snowflake/snowflake-arctic-embed-m-v1.5"; ... L109: }; L110: names = (await r.json()).models?.map((m) => m.name) ?? []; L111: } catch { ... L128: const f = deps.fetch ?? fetch; L129: const log = deps.log ?? ((m) => process.stderr.write(`${m}\n`)); L130: const getTok = deps.tokenizer ?? loadTokenizer;

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/embedding-gate-B4jwiqN2.mjsView on unpkg · L5

dist/hooks/cleanup-session-files.mjsView file

•Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path: replace(/\$home/g, homedir2()); value = value.replace(/^~(?=\/|$)/, homedir2()); if (process.env[key] === void 0) { process.env[key] = value; } } } break; } catch { } } } } loadenvfile(); function defaultadapterdir() { return resolve(homedir2(), ".claude"); } function suppressdeprecationnotices() { if (process.env.pai_quiet_notices === "1") return true; const idx = process.argv.indexof("--output-format"); return idx !== -1 && process.argv[idx + 1] === "json"; } function warnpaidirdeprecatedonce(message) { const g = globalthis; if (g.__paidirnoticeprinted || suppressdeprecationnotices()) return;

High

External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/hooks/cleanup-session-files.mjsView on unpkg

tab-color-command.shView file

•path = tab-color-command.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 860 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

tab-color-command.shView on unpkg

dist/launch-BCawmJrT.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 15

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/launch-BCawmJrT.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/daemon-DAajRyiw.mjsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @tekmidian/pai@0.71.3 matchedIdentity = npm:QHRla21pZGlhbi9wYWk:0.71.3 similarity = 0.992 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/daemon-DAajRyiw.mjsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

15 flagged · loading source

dist/session-B3qJnaix.mjsView file

23import chalk, { Chalk } from "chalk"; L24: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L25: import { createInterface } from "node:readline";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/session-B3qJnaix.mjsView on unpkg · L23

dist/run-BF56afeQ.mjsView file

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/run-BF56afeQ.mjsView on unpkg · L1501

dist/project-setup-Cu0Bumqv.mjsView file

Findings

4 Critical8 High5 Medium7 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli/index.mjs

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/embedding-gate-B4jwiqN2.mjs

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli/index.mjs

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/daemon-DAajRyiw.mjs

HighChild Processdist/session-B3qJnaix.mjs

HighShelldist/run-BF56afeQ.mjs

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli/index.mjs

HighExternal Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/hooks/cleanup-session-files.mjs

HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/cli/index.mjs

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/cli/index.mjs

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @tekmidian/pai@0.71.4.

See all versions of @tekmidian/pai for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @tekmidian/pai@0.71.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-20 04:34:22.331Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code