@telora/daemon@0.22.57
Agent orchestration daemon for Telora - spawns and manages Claude Code instances
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source supports a first-party agent setup capability with ongoing effects on a shared instruction file, so a warning is appropriate. The lifecycle and runtime hints do not establish automatic install-time abuse or a concrete attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines a prepublishOnly build step, not an automatic install hook.
- The connect command is an explicit user-invoked setup flow.
- On daemon startup, the refresh routine can rewrite an existing global Codex instruction file when products and connection details are configured.
- That Codex file is described as workstation-shared, so refreshed instructions may affect interactive and hosted agent sessions.
- The unresolved runtime locations concern checking for a missing sidecar environment and logging a resolution outcome; they do not establish an attack.
- The inspected source does not show credential disclosure, permission bypass, or another concrete attack.
- Connect configuration stores Telora connection details under the user's home directory.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/update/self-update.jsView on unpkg · L25Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
dist/update/self-update.jsView on unpkg · L16Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @telora/daemon@0.22.57.
See all versions of @telora/daemon for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @telora/daemon@0.22.57 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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