@telora/daemon@0.22.85
Agent orchestration daemon for Telora - spawns and manages Claude Code instances
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo install-time hook, self-dependency chain, secret harvesting, or concealed payload was found. The explicit agent hook registration and automatic global updater remain dangerous capabilities that warrant a warning.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Run telora-daemon connect with a token, or run the daemon while automatic updates are enabled.
Impact
Later Claude events can execute Telora companion commands; an update can replace the globally installed daemon with a newer registry release.
Mechanism
Token redemption, AI-agent hook registration, and global self-update.
AI rationale
No install-time hook, self-dependency chain, secret harvesting, or concealed payload was found. The explicit agent hook registration and automatic global updater remain dangerous capabilities that warrant a warning.
Evidence
dist/cli/connect.jsdist/cli/connect/registration.jsdist/update/self-update.js~/.claude/settings.json~/.telora/daemon.json.mcp.json
Network endpoints2
api.syntelyos.comregistry.npmjs.org
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 87.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The user-invoked connect command redeems a supplied token with the Telora API.
- Connect conditionally adds command hooks to the user's Claude settings when companion binaries are present.
- The running daemon can automatically install the latest global release of itself.
Evidence against
- package.json has no install, preinstall, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- The manifest has no runtime dependency on @telora/daemon.
- The hook mutation is reachable through the explicit connect command, not package installation.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcedist/update/self-update.jsView file
25*/
L26: import { execFileSync, execFile } from 'node:child_process';
L27: import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/update/self-update.jsView on unpkg · L2516* Three installation modes:
L17: * - **npm**: Installed globally via `npm install -g @telora/daemon`.
L18: * Updates via `npm install -g @telora/daemon@latest`.
...
L25: */
L26: import { execFileSync, execFile } from 'node:child_process';
L27: import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
High
Runtime Package Install
Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
dist/update/self-update.jsView on unpkg · L16dist/verify/verification-baseline.jsView file
122}
L123: /** Spawn `sh -c command` in cwd and capture the FULL combined stdout+stderr. */
L124: function runShellCapture(command, cwd, timeoutMs) {
Findings
1 Critical4 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalKnown Malicious Dependency Insertionpackage.json
HighChild Processdist/update/self-update.js
HighShelldist/verify/verification-baseline.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/update/self-update.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedbuild-info.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperscripts/telora-daemon-wrapper.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @telora/daemon@0.22.85.
See all versions of @telora/daemon for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @telora/daemon@0.22.85 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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