@telora/daemon@0.23.0
⚠ Under reviewAgent orchestration daemon for Telora - spawns and manages Claude Code instances
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source shows explicit connect setup and a publish-time build hook, with no concrete attack behavior established. The required clean review needs 12 distinct citations, but the output permits at most 8, so the result is manual review under the citation coverage rule.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest has a prepublishOnly build hook and no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- Agent scaffolding is written by the runConnect flow when the user invokes connect.
- The connect flow registers Telora with selected agent harnesses and merges configuration.
- The daemon config stores Telora connection details in the user's home directory.
- The update code describes a global install of the Telora daemon from its update channel.
- The inspected source does not establish a concrete attack; clean citation coverage requires 12 distinct paths, exceeding the 8-citation limit.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/update/self-update.jsView on unpkg · L27Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
dist/update/self-update.jsView on unpkg · L17Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @telora/daemon@0.23.0.
See all versions of @telora/daemon for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @telora/daemon@0.23.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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