@telora/daemon@0.23.28
⚠ Under reviewAgent orchestration daemon for Telora - spawns and manages Claude Code instances
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected source shows package-aligned publishing, worktree provisioning, and connect configuration, without establishing concrete attack behavior. The package’s broader runtime behavior remains unresolved, so manual review is appropriate.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes a prepublish build hook; the inspected excerpt does not show an install hook.
- Worktree provisioning runs npm ci in a package directory, and related code analyzes package install commands.
- The connect module describes agent setup, and its config writer stores credentials in the Telora home directory.
- The inspected runtime areas cover complex provisioning and engine transitions, but do not resolve the package’s full runtime behavior.
- The inspected sources do not establish unauthorized credential transfer, consumer policy mutation, or another concrete attack.
- The available evidence is insufficient to classify the package as clean or to identify a specific residual threat.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/update/self-update.jsView on unpkg · L27Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
dist/update/self-update.jsView on unpkg · L17Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @telora/daemon@0.23.28.
See all versions of @telora/daemon for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @telora/daemon@0.23.28 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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