MCP server exposing Telora product operations to Claude Code
Soft block: AI-agent control surface
Warn by default; block when configured. Those commands are configured to run during tool-use and prompt events across the user’s Claude Code sessions.
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The install hook automatically adds commands to a global AI-agent control surface without user consent. This is a concrete install-time control-surface mutation, so publishing should be blocked.
npm installation when both Telora hook binaries are on PATH.
Impact
Those commands are configured to run during tool-use and prompt events across the user’s Claude Code sessions.
Mechanism
The postinstall script edits ~/.claude/settings.json and registers commands for PostToolUse and UserPromptSubmit events.
Policy narrative
During installation, if both Telora hook binaries are available, the package edits the user-wide Claude Code settings and registers them for prompt and tool-use events. The script has no consent check for this global configuration change.
Avoid installing @telora/mcp-products@0.23.16. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, check your AI agents' configuration and instruction files (the files this report lists) for changes you did not make, and remove them. This finding does not by itself establish malware intent.