MCP server exposing Telora product operations to Claude Code
Soft block: AI-agent control surface
Warn by default; block when configured. The commands are configured to run from Claude Code hooks across the user’s projects.
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The install-time script silently adds hooks to the user-wide Claude settings when Telora binaries are present. This unconsented mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface supports blocking publication.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Installing the package when both Telora hook binaries are on PATH.
Impact
The commands are configured to run from Claude Code hooks across the user’s projects.
Mechanism
The script updates the user-wide Claude settings with prompt-submission and post-tool-use hooks, then writes the modified file.
Policy narrative
The package manifest automatically runs the postinstall script. When both Telora hook binaries are available, the script edits the global Claude settings and registers them for prompt submissions and tool use. The source shows no consent check before writing this broad agent configuration, so this is an install-time control-surface change.
Avoid installing @telora/mcp-products@0.23.21. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, check your AI agents' configuration and instruction files (the files this report lists) for changes you did not make, and remove them. This finding does not by itself establish malware intent.