MCP server exposing Telora product operations to Claude Code
Soft block: AI-agent control surface
Warn by default; block when configured. Claude Code can invoke these commands automatically during tool use and prompt submission, changing agent behavior without the user explicitly requesting the setup.
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The enabled postinstall hook modifies Claude Code's user settings and installs commands on prompt and tool event hooks without an explicit user request. This is install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Package installation, when both Telora hook binaries are on PATH.
Impact
Claude Code can invoke these commands automatically during tool use and prompt submission, changing agent behavior without the user explicitly requesting the setup.
Mechanism
The postinstall script adds commands to PostToolUse and UserPromptSubmit in ~/.claude/settings.json and writes the settings file.
Policy narrative
During installation, if both Telora hook binaries are available on PATH, the package modifies the user's Claude Code settings to invoke them on tool-use and prompt-submission events. This is an unconsented install-time mutation of an AI-agent control surface.
Avoid installing @telora/mcp-products@0.23.27. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, check your AI agents' configuration and instruction files (the files this report lists) for changes you did not make, and remove them. This finding does not by itself establish malware intent.