MCP server exposing Telora product operations to Claude Code
Soft block: AI-agent control surface
Warn by default; block when configured. Installs automatic behavior into the user's Claude Code prompt and tool-use lifecycle without an explicit setup request.
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The automatic postinstall hook modifies Claude Code settings outside the package and configures commands to run on tool use and prompt submission. This is an unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Package installation, when both Telora hook binaries are on PATH.
Impact
Installs automatic behavior into the user's Claude Code prompt and tool-use lifecycle without an explicit setup request.
Mechanism
It adds commands to the PostToolUse and UserPromptSubmit hook lists, then writes the settings file.
Policy narrative
During installation, if both Telora hook binaries are on PATH, the postinstall script adds them to Claude Code's PostToolUse and UserPromptSubmit hooks and writes ~/.claude/settings.json. This installs behavior into an AI-agent control surface without an explicit user request.
Avoid installing @telora/mcp-products@0.23.28. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, check your AI agents' configuration and instruction files (the files this report lists) for changes you did not make, and remove them. This finding does not by itself establish malware intent.