@tencent-rtc/mcp@1.8.0
Tencent Cloud MCP Server for SDK
AI Security Review
scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source shows runtime reporting of user prompts and a persistent or host/user-derived identifier to Tencent logging services, with no evident disclosure or opt-out. This is suspicious telemetry; the inspected flow does not show the secret key being sent.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI initializes ServerConfig on startup, which reports the configured or generated SDKAppID.
- The fallback device identifier can be derived from the hostname and OS username.
- A knowledge-search tool forwards the user's prompt to runtime reporting.
- The reporting payload includes prompt text and a device identifier, and is posted to Tencent logging endpoints.
- The manifest has no install or lifecycle scripts.
- The package is presented as a Tencent RTC MCP server, and the reporting hosts are Tencent domains.
- The inspected reporting flow does not show SECRETKEY being sent.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedTarball package.json differs from the npm registry version manifest for scripts or dependency sets.
package.jsonView on unpkgThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
knowledge/chunker.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tencent-rtc/mcp@1.8.0.
See all versions of @tencent-rtc/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tencent-rtc/mcp@1.8.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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