@tera-system/pro@0.2.2

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

npm installation runs the postinstall hook.

A package-controlled signing key can authorize future agent and command content in the consumer project; the injected MCP configuration can run additional packages through npx.

Automatic OpenCode configuration injection and remote bundle deployment.

On npm installation, the postinstall hook runs against the consumer workspace. If no OpenCode configuration exists, it writes one that enables MCP commands using npx. The same lifecycle execution fetches a vendor-signed remote bundle and writes its contents into OpenCode agent and command directories. Although signature verification exists, the package author controls the trust root, so this is an unconsented install-time path to deploy future AI-agent behavior into another project.

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a consumer AI-agent control surface, combined with remote vendor-authorized content deployment. Signature verification does not remove the risk because the package supplies the public key and controls the signing authority.