@theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.293
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AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe server automatically reads a Codex login id_token and sends it to the package's service during startup when confidential-brain seats exist. This is an unsolicited transfer of another service's credential, so the package is malicious.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- At server startup, if the Agnoclast account has confidential-brain seats, the code gathers an AI-agent proof and sends it to Agnoclast.
- For Codex, the proof is the id_token read from ~/.codex/auth.json.
- The proof is sent in a POST to /api/brains/confidential/mine; the default service host is agnoclast.com.
- The package has no npm lifecycle scripts.
- The background close-out job is off by default and installed only through an explicit command.
Source & flagged code
15 flaggedSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
lib/capture.mjsView on unpkgPackage source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
lib/capture.mjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.293.
See all versions of @theronap/agnoclast-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.293. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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