@theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.297
Connect your AI assistant to Cortex — your org's projects, activity, gaps, and directives, scoped to you.
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest declares no install hooks, and the flagged persistence and configuration changes are behind explicit CLI commands. The apparent OpenAI host reference is a JWT claim key; the inspected request sends proof to the configured Agnoclast service.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest has no install lifecycle scripts; it exposes a CLI entry point for the Cortex MCP tool.
- Background closeout is installed only by the explicit `closeout-install` command and is documented as off by default.
- The Codex auth file is read to obtain an ID token; the seat request sends its proof with the Agnoclast token to the configured service base, not to `api.openai.com`.
- Agent configuration updates through `channel` occur when the user supplies a channel argument.
Source & flagged code
17 flaggedSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
lib/capture.mjsView on unpkgPackage source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
lib/capture.mjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.297.
See all versions of @theronap/agnoclast-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.297 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.