@theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.301
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AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no install lifecycle hooks, and the flagged persistence path is an explicitly invoked, off-by-default feature. The credential and file flows reviewed are scoped to the configured Agnoclast service and its features; file capture itself only nudges the session when uploads are enabled.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest declares no install, preinstall, or postinstall lifecycle scripts.
- The persistence behavior is behind the separate closeout-install command; its source describes it as off by default.
- File capture checks the configured upload setting and nudges the session to use Agnoclast tools; it does not upload file contents itself.
- Confidential-session proof is sent to the configured Agnoclast service only when a session requests access to a named confidential brain.
- On SessionStart, status can add this package’s own hooks to Claude settings when missing.
- When file uploads are enabled, the hook supplies the file path to the session, which may then store the file through Agnoclast.
Source & flagged code
17 flaggedSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
lib/capture.mjsView on unpkgPackage source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
lib/capture.mjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.301.
See all versions of @theronap/agnoclast-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.301 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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