@theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.303
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AI Security Review
scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the reviewed credential path uses AI account proof for confidential-brain access through the package’s service. The flagged background job and configuration edits are reached through explicit commands; the OpenAI URL is only a locally parsed JWT claim namespace.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest has no install, preinstall, or postinstall lifecycle hook; it exposes an explicit CLI entrypoint.
- The server gathers an AI account proof only when confidential-brain seats exist, and confidential access is requested through the Agnoclast API.
- The OpenAI URL string is used as a JWT claim namespace while parsing a token locally; the inspected code does not send the token to OpenAI.
- The closeout launch agent is described as off by default and is installed through a dedicated CLI subcommand.
- Channel configuration changes run only when the user supplies a channel to the channel command.
Source & flagged code
17 flaggedSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
lib/capture.mjsView on unpkgPackage source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
lib/capture.mjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.303.
See all versions of @theronap/agnoclast-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.303 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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