@theronap/cortex-mcp@0.9.123
Renamed to @theronap/agnoclast-mcp — use that. Existing installs switch themselves to the new name on next start.
Connect your AI assistant to Cortex — your org's projects, activity, gaps, and directives, scoped to you.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source establishes an explicit user-command agent extension that persists hooks, permissions, and skill content and transmits session-derived data. There is no automatic npm lifecycle trigger or concrete covert malware behavior, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
The user runs the setup or install command; installed hooks then run during agent sessions.
Impact
It changes global agent control surfaces, pre-authorizes package tools, and transmits session-derived data to the service.
Mechanism
Persistent agent configuration and authenticated session capture.
AI rationale
The source establishes an explicit user-command agent extension that persists hooks, permissions, and skill content and transmits session-derived data. There is no automatic npm lifecycle trigger or concrete covert malware behavior, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Evidence
package.jsonlib/setup.mjslib/editors/claude.mjslib/capture.mjslib/skills.mjslib/diagnose.mjs~/.claude.json~/.claude/settings.json~/.codex/config.toml~/.codex/hooks.json~/.claude/skills~/.codex/skills~/.cortex/org-skills-cache.json
Network endpoints2
cortex-console.vercel.app/api/ingestcortex-console.vercel.app/api/skills
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 92.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- Explicit setup rewrites Claude and Codex agent configuration and installs hooks.
- The Claude configuration pre-authorizes package namespaces, including authoring tools.
- A stop hook reads session data and posts an ingest body with the wired bearer token.
- Session-start repair fetches and installs server-provided skills into agent skill directories.
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The configuration changes require the user to run setup or install.
- Network use targets the package service and the capture path redacts credential-shaped strings.
- No hidden payload, unrelated endpoint, or destructive behavior was found in the inspected source.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedlib/capture.mjsView file
1import { readFileSync, accessSync, constants, openSync, mkdirSync } from 'fs'
L2: import { spawn, execFileSync } from 'child_process'
L3: import { homedir } from 'os'
...
L17: if (!res.ok) return null
L18: const j = await res.json().catch(() => ({}))
L19: return Array.isArray(j.types) ? j.types : null
...
L31: try {
L32: if (resolve(String(cwd)) === homedir()) return 'general'
L33: } catch { /* unresolvable path — fall through to basename */ }
...
L41: //
L42: // Handles the four remote forms git emits: scp-like ssh (git@github.com:o/n.git), ssh://, https://,
L43: // git://. The HOST CHECK IS LOAD-BEARING, not cosmetic: this string becomes a clearance key, and
Low
Weak Crypto
Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
lib/capture.mjsView on unpkg · L1lib/editors/antigravity.mjsView file
4Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> bin/cortex-mcp.mjs -> lib/install.mjs -> lib/editors/index.mjs -> lib/editors/antigravity.mjs
L4: // WatchPaths the trajectory store and runs a one-shot sync. wire() generates the two artifacts
L5: // (the sync.sh + the launchd plist) deterministically. It does NOT run `launchctl load` here
L6: // (an unverifiable system mutation) and it flags the PORTABILITY BLOCKER below.
...
L21: /** The launchd plist, home-substituted. Deterministic — golden-testable byte-for-byte. */
L22: export function renderAntigravityPlist({ home = homedir() } = {}) {
L23: const sh = join(home, '.cortex', 'antigravity-sync.sh')
...
L33: <array>
L34: <string>/bin/bash</string>
L35: <string>${sh}</string>
Findings
2 High5 Medium5 Low
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationlib/uninstall.mjs
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencelib/editors/antigravity.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencelib/editors/antigravity.mjs
MediumAi Review Evidencelib/setup.mjs
MediumStripped Provenance Metadatalib/editors/claude.mjs
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptolib/capture.mjs
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @theronap/cortex-mcp@0.9.123.
See all versions of @theronap/cortex-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @theronap/cortex-mcp@0.9.123 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.