AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious install-time or import-time attack surface. Risky primitives are tied to the stated streamer CLI/server purpose and user-invoked operations.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json postinstall executes node -e chmod on node-pty prebuild spawn-helper
- dist/seed-claude-config.cjs can write a CLAUDE_CONFIG file when explicitly run
- dist/index.cjs spawns claude/codex PTYs and uses --permission-mode acceptEdits
- dist/cli.cjs contains user-invoked updater/service controls
- postinstall only chmods node-pty's platform spawn-helper, no network or foreign agent config writes
- main/import files define APIs; server/PTY behavior starts via CLI serve or API calls
- Claude/Codex session reads are package-aligned conversation streaming/cache behavior
- seed-claude-config requires direct execution and CLAUDE_CONFIG env, not lifecycle-triggered
- GitHub update download is user/config-driven and verifies manifest sha256
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourceInstall-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/index.cjsView on unpkgSource spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.
dist/index.cjsView on unpkg · L106Package contains source files above the static scanner size ceiling.
dist/cli.cjsView on unpkgPackage contains an oversized executable-looking CLI entrypoint.
dist/cli.cjsView on unpkg