@threadlines/server@0.3.1
Threadlines server and CLI for running coding-agent sessions.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner's command-output exfiltration claim is not supported by the inspected execution paths. This is a legitimate but high-capability agent orchestration package with default telemetry, so warn rather than block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/bin.mjs launches configured Codex/Claude CLI processes and exposes agent/browser tooling.
- dist/bin.mjs permits user-requested project AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md writes.
- dist/bin.mjs enables PostHog telemetry by default and posts runtime event metadata.
- Telemetry includes hashed installation ID, platform, architecture, project/thread counts, and provider events.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The only package entrypoint is the explicit threadlines CLI.
- Process execution is runtime functionality for a coding-agent server, not install-time behavior.
- Telemetry endpoint and payload are declared; no command-output upload or stealth endpoint was found.
- Agent instruction-file writes are project-root constrained and exposed through an authenticated RPC handler.
- Telemetry can be disabled through settings or THREADLINES_TELEMETRY_ENABLED.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/shell-DamM0QVE.mjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @threadlines/server@0.3.1.
See all versions of @threadlines/server for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @threadlines/server@0.3.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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