@threadlines/server@0.3.2
Threadlines server and CLI for running coding-agent sessions.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiScanner claims of command-output exfiltration are not supported by the inspected source: command output is retained for local provider-update status. The observed process, credential, network, and filesystem capabilities are package-aligned and runtime/user-invoked.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json has no lifecycle scripts; execution is via the user-invoked threadlines CLI.
- dist/bin.mjs starts only when import.meta.main and runs a local server/CLI.
- Shell and PTY execution implement the advertised coding-agent terminal feature.
- Claude OAuth credential reads are used only for an authenticated request to api.anthropic.com usage endpoint.
- PostHog telemetry uses an anonymous installation ID and feature-event metadata, not command output.
- No source evidence sends shell command output, harvested credentials, or files to an attacker endpoint.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/shell-DamM0QVE.mjsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @threadlines/server@0.3.2.
See all versions of @threadlines/server for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @threadlines/server@0.3.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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