--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@threadplane/render/v/0.2.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@threadplane/render/v/0.2.0.md" package: "@threadplane/render" report_status: "published" title: "@threadplane/render@0.2.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.2.0" --- # @threadplane/render@0.2.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 12 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Data Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 0.2.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Source confirms default transmission of personal Git identity during installation, supporting a warning for data exposure. The disclosed vendor collection and effective opt-outs do not establish malicious intent strongly enough to justify blocking. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-05T04:01:40.155Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-05T04:04:03.489Z - **Download time:** 766 ms - **Static scan time:** 151 ms - **AI review time:** 142416 ms - **Total time:** 143334 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Automatic installation collection exposes configured Git identity to the package vendor. This warrants a privacy warning, but the inspected source does not establish a malicious attack. - **Trigger:** An npm installation runs postinstall unless lifecycle scripts or collection are disabled. - **Impact:** Developer identity and repository owner information can leave the machine during installation, including CI. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, install/postinstall.cjs, install/git-context.cjs, install/collector.cjs, install/policy.cjs, README.md - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-05T04:04:03.489Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The collector reads Git configuration, attaches names and full emails to installation events, and sends them by HTTPS without an opt-in gate. - **Rationale:** Source confirms default transmission of personal Git identity during installation, supporting a warning for data exposure. The disclosed vendor collection and effective opt-outs do not establish malicious intent strongly enough to justify blocking. - **Files touched:** .gitconfig, .git/config, .threadplane/installation-id, .install-collector/development-install.mjs - **Network endpoints:** https://threadplane.ai/api/growth/collect/v1/install ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** package.json automatically runs an installation collector through postinstall., install/git-context.cjs reads global Git configuration and collects the configured full email address., install/collector.cjs sends collected identity in installation events to a fixed Threadplane HTTPS endpoint., Collection is enabled by default; install/policy.cjs provides environment-variable opt-outs., README.md discloses automatic collection of Git names and full emails, including in CI. - **Evidence against:** The destination belongs to the package vendor and cannot be overridden in the inspected collector., Configuration reads are bounded; repository hints exclude raw URLs and repository names., No credential theft, remote payload execution, or broad agent configuration mutation was identified. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @threadplane/render@0.2.0. - Review the evidence and your use of @threadplane/render@0.2.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 8. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** install/git-context.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @threadplane/render@0.1.0 matchedIdentity = npm:QHRocmVhZHBsYW5lL3JlbmRlcg:0.1.0 similarity = 0.818 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ### 9. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() package.json automatically runs an installation collector through postinstall. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json "postinstall": "node install/postinstall.cjs" }, "module": "f ``` ### 10. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** install/git-context.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() install/git-context.cjs reads global Git configuration and collects the configured full email address. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript const global = { ...parseConfig(await readBounded(path.join(xdg, 'git/config'))), ...parseConfig(await readBounded(path.join(home, '.gitconfig'))), }; const config = await consumerConfig(e ``` ### 11. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** install/git-context.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() install/git-context.cjs reads global Git configuration and collects the configured full email address. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript if (email && /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+$/u.test(email)) { identity.gitEmail = email; origins.push(Object.hasOwn(local, 'email') ? 'local' : 'global'); } if (origins ``` ### 12. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** install/collector.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() install/collector.cjs sends collected identity in installation events to a fixed Threadplane HTTPS endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript const ENDPOINT = 'https://threadplane.[redacted]'; const PACKAGES = ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 1 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 4 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 5 ### Published dependency entries - tslib ^2.3.0 (Dependency) - @angular/common ^20.0.0 || ^21.0.0 || ^22.0.0 (PeerDependency) - @angular/core ^20.0.0 || ^21.0.0 || ^22.0.0 (PeerDependency) - @json-render/core ^0.16.0 (PeerDependency) - @threadplane/telemetry ^0.2.0 (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @threadplane/render - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.2.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-18T17:37:11.775Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-08T00:11:36.298Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-01T08:26:15.304Z - **Known versions:** 18 - **Latest version:** 0.3.4 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Angular render engine for agent-generated UI: maps JSON specs onto your own design-system components. - **Maintainers:** blove - **Artifact files:** 15 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 205,076 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()