---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@thuanha-groove/gck/v/0.0.2"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@thuanha-groove/gck/v/0.0.2.md"
package: "@thuanha-groove/gck"
report_status: "published"
title: "@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.0.2"
---

# @thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 0.0.2
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The automatic postinstall changes Claude agent configuration and can install skills, which warrants a warning for agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected credential transfers are service-aligned and do not support a malicious exfiltration finding.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 84.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-26T04:11:39.189Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-26T04:20:30.117Z
- **Download time:** 1526 ms
- **Static scan time:** 9250 ms
- **AI review time:** 520150 ms
- **Total time:** 530928 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The postinstall hook can automatically change Claude configuration and restore kit hooks or install skills. This creates a lifecycle risk for agent settings, while the inspected credential flows do not establish exfiltration.

- **Trigger:** Package installation invokes the postinstall script.

- **Impact:** Claude settings or installed skills may change without a separate user command.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/postinstall-self-heal.cjs, bin/postinstall-hook-restore.cjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-26T04:20:30.117Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The helper examines project and global Claude settings, prunes matching legacy prompts, and conditionally launches kit initialization with hook restoration and skill installation.

- **Rationale:** The automatic postinstall changes Claude agent configuration and can install skills, which warrants a warning for agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected credential transfers are service-aligned and do not support a malicious exfiltration finding.

- **Files touched:** package.json, bin/postinstall-self-heal.cjs, bin/postinstall-hook-restore.cjs

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 84.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The manifest runs the self-heal helper automatically during postinstall., The helper scans project and global Claude settings, removes a narrowly matched legacy prompt, and may restore missing hooks and install skills when an installed kit is detected., The inspected API key is entered by the user and sent to the package service for validation; a GitHub token is sent to GitHub’s rate-limit endpoint.

- **Evidence against:** The inspected credential flows use user-entered or saved credentials for their named services; they do not establish unrelated credential exfiltration., The hook restoration checks for an installed kit and missing registrations before invoking initialization.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2.

- Review the evidence and your use of @thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall-self-heal.cjs
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/postinstall-hook-restore.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/bin/postinstall-hook-restore.cjs>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L6: const path = require("node:path");
L7: const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");
L8:
```

### 5. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L44332: 
L44333: // node_modules/powershell-utils/index.js
L44334: import process11 from "node:process";
```

### 6. High: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L8288: if (ast.body[0].expression.body.type === "BlockStatement") {
L8289: return new Function(params, source.slice(body[0] + 1, body[1] - 1));
L8290: }
```

### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** bin/postinstall-self-heal.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/bin/postinstall-self-heal.cjs>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L3: 
L4: const fs = require("node:fs");
L5: const os = require("node:os");
```

### 8. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L141: var env = p.env || {};
L142: var isColorSupported = !(!!env.NO_COLOR || argv.includes("--no-color")) && (!!env.FORCE_COLOR || argv.includes("--color") || p.platform === "win32" || (p.stdout || {}).isTTY && env...
L143: var formatter = (open, close, replace = open) => (input) => {
...
L313: this._track && (this.value = this.rl.line.replace(/\t/g, ""), this._cursor = this.rl.cursor, this.emit("value", this.value)), s();
L314: }, this.input.pipe(u), this.rl = _.createInterface({ input: this.input, output: u, tabSize: 2, prompt: "", escapeCodeTimeout: 50 }), _.emitKeypressEvents(this.input, this.rl), this...
L315: this.once("submit", () => {
...
L482: e.exports = u, u.eastAsianWidth = function(t) {
L483: var s = t.charCodeAt(0), C = t.length == 2 ? t.charCodeAt(1) : 0, D = s;
L484: retur
```

### 9. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 10. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 11. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 12. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L141: var env = p.env || {};
L142: var isColorSupported = !(!!env.NO_COLOR || argv.includes("--no-color")) && (!!env.FORCE_COLOR || argv.includes("--color") || p.platform === "win32" || (p.stdout || {}).isTTY && env...
L143: var formatter = (open, close, replace = open) => (input) => {
...
L313: this._track && (this.value = this.rl.line.replace(/\t/g, ""), this._cursor = this.rl.cursor, this.emit("value", this.value)), s();
L314: }, this.input.pipe(u), this.rl = _.createInterface({ input: this.input, output: u, tabSize: 2, prompt: "", escapeCodeTimeout: 50 }), _.emitKeypressEvents(this.input, this.rl), this...
L315: this.once("submit", () => {
...
L482: e.exports = u, u.eastAsianWidth = function(t) {
L483: var s = t.charCodeAt(0), C = t.length == 2 ? t.charCodeAt(1) : 0, D = s;
L484: retur
```

### 13. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L141: var env = p.env || {};
L142: var isColorSupported = !(!!env.NO_COLOR || argv.includes("--no-color")) && (!!env.FORCE_COLOR || argv.includes("--color") || p.platform === "win32" || (p.stdout || {}).isTTY && env...
L143: var formatter = (open, close, replace = open) => (input) => {
...
L313: this._track && (this.value = this.rl.line.replace(/\t/g, ""), this._cursor = this.rl.cursor, this.emit("value", this.value)), s();
L314: }, this.input.pipe(u), this.rl = _.createInterface({ input: this.input, output: u, tabSize: 2, prompt: "", escapeCodeTimeout: 50 }), _.emitKeypressEvents(this.input, this.rl), this...
L315: this.once("submit", () => {
...
L482: e.exports = u, u.eastAsianWidth = function(t) {
L483: var s = t.charCodeAt(0), C = t.length == 2 ? t.charCodeAt(1) : 0, D = s;
L484: retur
```

### 14. Critical: Reverse Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 92.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L141: var env = p.env || {};
L142: var isColorSupported = !(!!env.NO_COLOR || argv.includes("--no-color")) && (!!env.FORCE_COLOR || argv.includes("--color") || p.platform === "win32" || (p.stdout || {}).isTTY && env...
L143: var formatter = (open, close, replace = open) => (input) => {
...
L313: this._track && (this.value = this.rl.line.replace(/\t/g, ""), this._cursor = this.rl.cursor, this.emit("value", this.value)), s();
L314: }, this.input.pipe(u), this.rl = _.createInterface({ input: this.input, output: u, tabSize: 2, prompt: "", escapeCodeTimeout: 50 }), _.emitKeypressEvents(this.input, this.rl), this...
L315: this.once("submit", () => {
...
L482: e.exports = u, u.eastAsianWidth = function(t) {
L483: var s = t.charCodeAt(0), C = t.length == 2 ? t.charCodeAt(1) : 0, D = s;
L484: retur
```

### 15. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L141: var env = p.env || {};
L142: var isColorSupported = !(!!env.NO_COLOR || argv.includes("--no-color")) && (!!env.FORCE_COLOR || argv.includes("--color") || p.platform === "win32" || (p.stdout || {}).isTTY && env...
L143: var formatter = (open, close, replace = open) => (input) => {
...
L313: this._track && (this.value = this.rl.line.replace(/\t/g, ""), this._cursor = this.rl.cursor, this.emit("value", this.value)), s();
L314: }, this.input.pipe(u), this.rl = _.createInterface({ input: this.input, output: u, tabSize: 2, prompt: "", escapeCodeTimeout: 50 }), _.emitKeypressEvents(this.input, this.rl), this...
L315: this.once("submit", () => {
...
L482: e.exports = u, u.eastAsianWidth = function(t) {
L483: var s = t.charCodeAt(0), C = t.length == 2 ? t.charCodeAt(1) : 0, D = s;
L484: retur
```

### 16. High: Obfuscated Payload Loader
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1776: if (!fs[gracefulQueue]) {
L1777: queue = global[gracefulQueue] || [];
L1778: publishQueue(fs, queue);
```

### 17. High: Remote Agent Bridge
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10403: matter.read = function(filepath, options2) {
L10404: const str2 = fs.readFileSync(filepath, "utf8");
L10405: const file = matter(str2, options2);
...
L10652: });
L10653: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
L10654: import { existsSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
...
L15682: description: stringType().optional(),
L15683: baseUrl: stringType().optional(),
L15684: timeout: numberType().optional(),
```

### 18. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** bin/postinstall-self-heal.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/bin/postinstall-self-heal.cjs>)

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L79: if (pruned > 0) {
L80: fs.writeFileSync(filePath, `${JSON.stringify(settings, null, 2)}\n`);
L81: }
...
L107: if (initCwd && path.isAbsolute(initCwd)) {
L108: addIfSettingsFile(files, path.join(initCwd, ".claude", "settings.json"));
L109: addIfSettingsFile(files, path.join(initCwd, ".claude", "settings.local.json"));
L110: }
...
L112: const homeDir = getHomeDir();
L113: const globalClaudeDir = process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR || path.join(homeDir, ".claude");
L114: addIfSettingsFile(files, path.join(globalClaudeDir, "settings.json"));
```

### 19. High: Spawned Bundled Service Listener
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 78.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

Source launches a detached bundled service that exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Detached bundled service listener: dist/index.js launches a Node helper and exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener.
L141: var env = p.env || {};
L142: var isColorSupported = !(!!env.NO_COLOR || argv.includes("--no-color")) && (!!env.FORCE_COLOR || argv.includes("--color") || p.platform === "win32" || (p.stdout || {}).isTTY && env...
L143: var formatter = (open, close, replace = open) => (input) => {
...
L313: this._track && (this.value = this.rl.line.replace(/\t/g, ""), this._cursor = this.rl.cursor, this.emit("value", this.value)), s();
L314: }, this.input.pipe(u), this.rl = _.createInterface({ input: this.input, output: u, tabSize: 2, prompt: "", escapeCodeTimeout: 50 }), _.emitKeypressEvents(this.input, this.rl), this...
L315: this.once("submit", () => {
...
L482: e.exports = u, u.eastAsia
```

### 20. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 21. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 22. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 23. Medium: Wildcard Dependency
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest contains a wildcard dependency.

### 24. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@thuanha-groove/gck@0.0.2/dist/index.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 25
- **Optional dependencies:** 1
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 20
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 26

### Published dependency entries
- @clack/prompts ^0.7.0 (Dependency)
- @octokit/rest ^22.0.0 (Dependency)
- cac ^6.7.14 (Dependency)
- chokidar ^5.0.0 (Dependency)
- cli-progress ^3.12.0 (Dependency)
- compare-versions ^6.1.1 (Dependency)
- diff ^8.0.3 (Dependency)
- express ^5.2.1 (Dependency)
- extract-zip ^2.0.1 (Dependency)
- fs-extra ^11.2.0 (Dependency)
- get-port ^7.1.0 (Dependency)
- gray-matter ^4.0.3 (Dependency)
- ignore ^5.3.2 (Dependency)
- minimatch ^10.1.1 (Dependency)
- open ^11.0.0 (Dependency)
- ora ^8.0.0 (Dependency)
- p-limit ^7.2.0 (Dependency)
- picocolors ^1.1.1 (Dependency)
- picomatch ^4.0.3 (Dependency)
- proper-lockfile ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- semver ^7.7.3 (Dependency)
- tar ^7.4.3 (Dependency)
- tmp ^0.2.3 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.19.0 (Dependency)
- zod ^3.23.8 (Dependency)
- better-sqlite3 ^12.6.2 (OptionalDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @thuanha-groove/gck
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.0.2
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-10-26T04:07:33.306Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-10-26T04:20:30.117Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-14T11:45:34.551Z
- **Known versions:** 3
- **Latest version:** 0.0.4
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** CLI tool for bootstrapping and updating ClaudeKit projects
- **Author:** ClaudeKit
- **Maintainers:** thuanha-groove
- **Keywords:** cli, claudekit, boilerplate, bootstrap, template
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 32
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 5,864,747 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@thuanha-groove/gck/v/0.0.2>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/thuanha-groove/gck-cli>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/thuanha-groove/gck-cli#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/thuanha-groove/gck-cli/issues>)
