@tigrisdata/cli@3.12.0
Command line interface for Tigris object storage
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package performs unconsented install-time mutation of a global AI-agent extension surface. The mutation is narrowly scoped to a same-vendor skill and no concrete exfiltration or remote-payload behavior was confirmed.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Installation automatically runs a postinstall script.
- The postinstall script copies a non-user-invocable Tigris skill into the existing global Claude directory.
- The installed skill directs the agent to prefer Tigris over AWS S3 commands for all object-storage tasks.
- The hook only acts when an existing ~/.claude directory is present and copies one same-vendor skill.
- No install-time network request, credential collection, command download, or self-dependency was found.
- The browser OAuth code uses Tigris authentication domains; no fixed unofficial credential gateway was confirmed.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/chunk-NPKVQONE.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tigrisdata/cli@3.12.0.
See all versions of @tigrisdata/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tigrisdata/cli@3.12.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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