@tigrisdata/cli@3.12.1
Command line interface for Tigris object storage
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is an automatic first-party agent-extension installation, which is a real lifecycle risk but does not establish concrete malware behavior. The suspicious scanner claims about credential redirection are not supported by the inspected source.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs postinstall automatically.
- Postinstall copies its bundled skill into an existing global Claude Code directory.
- The copied skill directs agent use toward this vendor's storage CLI.
- The lifecycle hook only creates a namespaced Tigris skill and shows a terminal banner; no credential or file exfiltration was found.
- Agent MCP and skill configuration changes are performed by the explicit interactive tigris init command.
- The flagged custom endpoint is a user-supplied configure option, not a fixed credential-redirection host.
- No self-dependency, opaque payload download, or automatic broad agent-config rewrite was found.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/chunk-YXNJDI2L.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tigrisdata/cli@3.12.1.
See all versions of @tigrisdata/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @tigrisdata/cli@3.12.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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